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I. INTRODUCTION
The Nicole Simpson murder has focused public attention on domestic
violence as never before.1 Yet despite an unprecedented level of media
coverage and a proliferation of proposed legislation, domestic violence
remains the leading health risk for American women. 2
No issue in domestic violence reform is as critical as the need to stop
the repeat batterer before a homicide occurs, committed either by the
batterer or by the victim in self-defense. While a centerpiece of reform in
this area has been court intervention through the imposition of a civil
protection order, a method of swift and effective enforcement of such
orders has been elusive.
The current trend, pushed by some battered women advocates, is to
criminalize all violations of protection orders. This approach is a
misguided continuation of the search for "magic bullet" solutions that has
plagued domestic violence reform. It also relies exclusively on state
prosecutors who are often hostile to filing such charges, particularly when
the batterer's actions would not otherwise be considered a criminal
offense.3
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I See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
2 See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
3 Acts, such as repeated telephone calls, unsolicited letters and visits, are
violations of the stay away or no contact provisions that are often part of a civil
protection order. These incidents can be extremely distressing for the battered woman
although such acts are not otherwise considered criminal conduct or even unwelcome
under ordinary circumstances. Telephone Interview with Linda Osmundson, Director
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Instead, greater reliance should be placed on criminal contempt
sanctions as a remedy for protection order violations. Criminal contempt
sanctions can often be instituted and prosecuted by the offended civil party,
here the battered woman, 4 and usually require an expedited hearing which
may be critical to her safety.5 When coupled with criminal sanctions in
appropriate cases, and incorporated into a comprehensive attack on
domestic violence, the criminal contempt route empowers the battered
woman and assists her in escaping from a violent relationship.6
Part II of this Article outlines the social dynamic behind the persistence
of domestic violence in the context of the question, "Why do women
stay?," and the less often asked question, "Why do men batter?" Part II
also explores the flaws of mandatory arrest laws, which typify the "magic
bullet" approach that fails to address the complex relationship between the
social dynamic of battering and the legal/bureaucratic response.
In Part III, I build on work by Professor Martha Minow 7 and explore
the connection between legal language and domestic violence reform.8
Professor Minow has argued that new laws by themselves will not change
the common everyday language that accompanies and excuses domestic
violence. In other words, entrenched cultural attitudes cannot be changed
by legislative flat. To be effective, legal reforms must purposefully seek to
change this language of acceptance into language of rejection and
disapproval of domestic violence. Only by using transformative legal
language can legislation hope to alter individual beliefs and behavior.
Minow also shows that such transformative language must be crafted with
each actor in the social dynamic in mind-lawyers, police officers, judges,
social workers, and above all, victims whose desperate need is for
empowering language, not debilitating "victim talk." 9
I argue in Part III that domestic violence reforms will be more
transformative, and hence more successful, particularly with institutional
actors (e.g., police, prosecutors and judges), if they incorporate and
of CASA shelter, Pinellas County, Florida (Mar. 25, 1995).
4 See infra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text for statutes mandating expedited
hearings on contempt motions.
6 See infra part IV.B.
7 Professor of Law, The Harvard Law School. Professor Minow has written
extensively on family law, feminism, and legal language. See infra note 132 for a list
of related publications.
8 Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language,
and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1665 (1990).
9 Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. Rnv. 1411, 1420-21
(1993).
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connect with existing societal concepts and practices. In essence, reformers
must purposefully seek out existing language and practices as a wedge to
promote change in the cultural values underlying domestic violence.
However, reformers must be careful to choose only those existing practices
and language that can be co-opted for the goal of empowering battered
women.
I then make the specific case for combining the concept of
empowerment with the everyday and legal uses of "contempt" language in
the context of providing a remedy for protection order violations.
Contempt language has an everyday meaning that we apply to individuals
whose conduct we find despicable. Labelling domestic battering as
"contemptible," uses language that shifts the blame away from the victim
and rightfully onto the offender. At the same time, contempt language is
also powerful legal language, reserved for conduct that violates a court
order. Most importantly, criminal contempt sanctions are currently
available in most jurisdictions to sanction violations of civil protection
orders, either explicitly by statute or under the inherent power of a court to
vindicate its orders.' 0 Therefore, employing contempt sanctions to punish
protection order violations takes advantage of compatible common and
legal language, as well as an existing institutional practice. The confluence
of these factors presents a unique opportunity to integrate language and
policy to address a critical area of domestic violence.
In Part IV, I address the practical implications of this strategy. I show
that criminal contempt sanctions offer significant advantages and flexibility
when incorporated into a comprehensive attack on domestic violence. In
contrast, I demonstrate that the current trend to criminalize all violations of
civil protection orders simply repeats the failed single-remedy approach of
the past. I conclude with specific suggestions for implementing the criminal
contempt and empowerment approach for enforcement of civil protection
orders. "
II. THE PERSISTENCE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Introduction to the Problem
While feminists could fairly charge 12 as recently as 1967 that the
10 See infra notes 185-86.
11 Specifically, the potential double jeopardy consequences of multiple
prosecutions of the same act of domestic violence as contempt and under a criminal
statute must be considered. See infra notes 264-68 and accompanying text.12 Raymond I. Parnas, The American Bar Foundation Survey of the
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domestic battering1 3 of women was the American family's dirty secret, it is
now front page news. 14 The Simpson case in California, 15 the Hedda
Administration of Criminal Justice and Past, Present, and Future Responses to
Domestic Violence, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 107, 108 (1991).
13 A good definition of "woman battering" is "that pattern of violent and coercive
acts perpetrated by a person against a current or former partner, the calculated
purpose of which is to control the thoughts, beliefs, or conduct of the partner or to
punish the partner for resisting the perpetrator's control." Angela Corsilles, Note, No-
Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases: Guarantee to Action or
Dangerous Solution?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853, 853 n.1 (1994); see also LINDA
GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OwN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY
VIOLENCE: BOSTON 1880-1960 251 (1988) (focusing on the power relationship
between males and females and defining wife-beating as "the chronic battering of a
person of inferior power who for that reason cannot effectively resist").
As most authors on this subject, I too will refer to victims of domestic violence as
women because they constitute the overwhelming majority of victims. For general
background on battered women, see Barbara Hart, Lesbian Battering: An
Examination, in NAMING THE VIOLENCE: SPEAKING OUT ABOUT LESBIAN BATTERING
(Kerry Lobel ed., 1986); ELLEN PENCE ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE TO
DOMESTIC ASSAULT CASES: A GUIDE FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT (1985); SUSAN
SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE
BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT (1982).
There has been some conflict whether the term "battered woman" should be
limited to those who suffer physical abuse, or whether it should be broadened to
include psychological abuse as well. Lenore Walker, who is generally given credit for
first popularizing this issue, writes that battering also involves a cycle of behavior and
that a couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice for the relationship to
qualify. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN at xv (1979). Both Lenore
Walker's early work and her integrity have recently been severely criticized for her
willingness to testify as an expert witness on behalf of accused batterers, most notably
0.1. Simpson (much of this debate has taken place on the Internet bulletin boards).
For a sampling of this debate see in%femjur@suvm.syr.edu (transcript on file with the
author).
14 It is undisputed that the feminist movement was initially responsible for
bringing domestic violence to the forefront of the policy agenda. See, e.g., R.
EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL P. DOBASH, WOMEN, VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE
25 (1992); ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY
AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 184 (1987);
WALKER, supra note 13; Bernadette D. Sewell, Note, History of Abuse: Societal,
Judicial, and Legislative Responses to the Problem of Wife Beating, 23 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 983, 995-97 (1989). Social scientists also provided statistical data to support the
advocates' claims. The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment generally gets
credit for spurring the initial surge of study and legislative reform. The experiment
was first reported in Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Specific
Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 261 (1984).
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Nussbaum case in New York, 16 the Lorena Bobbitt case in Virginia, 17 and
a constant stream of well-publicized local tragedies18 have raised the
nation's awareness of domestic violence to perhaps its highest and most
sustained level ever.
While this widespread public awareness may be a new phenomenon,
those who have worked in the criminal justice and social service
professions have long been painfully aware of the pervasiveness and
intractability of the nation's domestic violence problem. For the past
twenty years, we have witnessed an explosion of academic articles, studies,
books, and symposia on the issue.' 9 Domestic violence reform work now
Professor Martha Minow argues that media coverage continues to be part of the
problem by either over-dramatizing individual cases or by reporting numbing
statistics. Minow, supra note 8, at 1684-85.
15 See, e.g., Cindy Loose, Case Has Area Hot Lines Jumping, WASH. POST, June
24, 1994, at A22 (noting that since the murder of Nicole Simpson the problem of
domestic violence has gripped the national consciousness). The media have also
attributed a recent flurry of state and federal legislative action to the concern
generated by the Simpson case. See, e.g., Patricia Edmonds, A Call to Arns Against
Spouse Abuse, USA TODAY, June 23, 1994, at 3A (reporting that the New York
Legislature reached an agreement on a bill requiring police to arrest spouse-beaters,
that New Jersey passed six new domestic violence bills, and that California proposed
new laws to hold spousal abuse defendants longer and maintain a registry of
restraining orders); Bill Turque, et al., 'He's Going Nuts', NEWSWEEK, July 4, 1994,
at 23 (reporting that New York and Colorado passed tough new domestic abuse laws
after 911 tapes of Nicole Simpson were played nonstop over the nation's airwaves).
Congress also recently passed the Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, 108 Stat. 1916 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13931-14040 (1994).
16 See Marianne Yen, Verdict Was Compromise, Jurors Say: Doubts About
Nussbaum, Defendant's Intent Led to Stalemate on Murder Count, WASH. POST, Feb.
1, 1989, at A3; Judy Mann, Steinberg's Excuse Works, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1989, at
B3.
17 See Maria E. Odum & Carlos Sanchez, A Symbol of Shared Rage; Dozens
Rallying Around Va. Woman Who Cut Husband, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1993, at B1.
18 In 1994, for example, Hillsborough County, Florida had thirty-four domestic
murders and approximately 6,400 misdemeanor domestic violence cases. William
March, Cops, Courts Get Tough on Abuse, TAMPA TiB., Feb. 8, 1995, at 1.
Nationwide, 2,167 women were killed by their spouses, ex-spouses, or lovers in 1992.
Id. Some of these deaths received extensive and in-depth coverage in the local press.
See Sue Carlton, Road to Mount Enon: The Story of a Domestic Killing, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMEs, Jan. 22, 1995, at 1F (Part I of a three-part series chronicling a
police officer, Charlie Trice, accused of killing his wife, Darla Trice, after a long
history of domestic violence in the marriage).
19 "Until 1967, not a single book or journal article focused on the law's response
to family violence. There was practically no legislation on the subject, nor focused
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extends beyond an isolated sphere of interest groups and advocates to
include legislative and executive branch agencies and special commissions
at all levels of government. 20 Even general-membership-legal and other
professional organizations have devoted time and resources to the issue.21
This activity has generated "solutions" to the problem at a prodigious
rate. Over the past twenty years, all fifty states have enacted laws intended
to rein in domestic violence. 22 As solutions have failed to produce the
desired results, some states have enacted more than one major legislative
initiative in less than a decade.23
Despite these concentrated efforts, domestic violence remains the
greatest cause of serious injury to American women, accounting for more
injurious episodes than rape, auto accidents, and mugging combined. 24
Other statistics are just as chilling. A woman is beaten every twelve
seconds.25 Fifteen hundred women a year (approximately four per day) die
organizations, reported litigation, or published research." Parnas, supra note 12, at
108. The Parnas article also chronicles the explosion of scholarly writings on this
subject beginning in the early 1970s. See id. at 108-20.
20 The U.S. Surgeon General has found that the battering of women is the "single
largest cause of injury to women in the United States." Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law
of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46,
46 (1992) (quoting Nikki R. Van Hightower & Susan A. McManus, Limits of State
Constitutional Guarantees: Lessons from Efforts to Implement Domestic Violence
Policies, 49 PuB. ADMN. REV. 269 (1989)). Many state governors and legislatures
have committees and advisory panels studying the issue. See, e.g., GOVERNOR'S TASK
FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, THE FIRST REPORT (1994) (Florida).
21 See, e.g., Conference Seeks to Prevent Violence Against Women, ATLA
ADVOCATE, Aug. 1993, at 1 (claiming that an interdisciplinary conference sponsored
by the Association of Trial Lawyers of America "broke new ground in uniting
physicians, lawyers, law enforcement officials, and representatives of victims' and
women's advocacy groups in efforts to stop violence directed at women and provide
services for women"); Sherry Stripling, Asking About Abuse, CHI. TRIB., June 23,
1992, at 7 (reporting that the American Medical Association started giving special
attention to domestic violence in 1990 and is now distributing information on the
problem through its newsletters).
22 See infra note 169.
23 Maura B. Johnson, Home Sweet Home?: New Jersey's Prevention of Domestic
Violence Act of 1991, 17 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 234, 244 (1993). New Jersey passed
two major acts on domestic violence, the first in 1981 and the second in 1991. N.J.
REv. STAT. §§ 2C:25-1 to -16 (1982) (repealed 1991); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2C:25-17 to -33 (Supp. 1992).
24 Cris Barrish, Woman on the Run, NEWS-JouRNAL (Wilmington, Del.), Feb. 4,
1990, at Al (citing Federal crime statistics); see Corsilles, supra note 13, at 854 n.6.
25 Elena Salzman, Note, The Quincy District Court Domestic Violence Prevention
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at the hands of an abusive male partner. 26 Roughly twenty-one thousand
domestic crimes against women are reported every week27-more than a
million assaults, murders, and rapes in a year. 28 These are the reported
crimes. Police estimate that for each of these crimes, three more go
unreported. 29 In all, there are an estimated 1.8 to 4 million incidents of
domestic violence each year. 30
B. Why Public Awareness Has Not Changed Private Behavior
1. Gender Roles and the Battering Relationship
While part of the failure of the past twenty years of legal reform can
rightly be attributed to flaws in the programs and the unwillingness of
institutional actors to implement these changes, this can be only part of a
serious analysis. An honest appraisal of domestic violence must
acknowledge that it is domestic violence's historical roots, which are still
deeply entrenched in much of our culture, that account for its persistence. 31
Program, 74 B.U. L. REv. 329, 329 n.3 (1994) (citing statistics from the FBI and
various other sources). Women are nine times more likely to be injured in the home
than on the streets. LYNN H. SCHAFRAN, PROMOTING GENDER FAIRNESS THROUGH
JUDICIAL EDUCATION: A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES AND RESOURCES 48 (1989) (citing
statistics from the Center for Disease Control).
26 Nina Burleigh, Swaying in the Wind: For Some, Justice Can Be a Cruel Force,
CHI. TRiB., Mar. 18, 1990, § 6, at 1.
27 S. REP. No. 118, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1992).
28 Id.
29 Id. Domestic violence also consumes a huge proportion of public services.
Battered women account for 20% of all hospital emergency cases, and domestic
disturbances are the largest category of calls received by police each year. RICHARD J.
GELLES & CLAIRE P. CORNELL, INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES (1985).
30 See Women and Violence: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary
on Legislation to Reduce the Growing Problem of Violent Crime Against Women, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 117 (1990) (testimony of Angela Browne).
31 Feminist historians trace the roots of wife beating to the historical domination
by men of the family-the patriarchy. The absolute authority of husbands over their
wives dates back to Roman and Christian law and led to legalized domestic violence
into the eighteenth century in Europe, England and early America. R. Emerson
Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, Wives: The "Appropriate" Victims of Marital Violence,
2 VIcrIMOLOGy 426, 427-30 (1978). Only in the late nineteenth century did some
states start to prohibit wife beating. Prior to then, it was considered a husband's
marital obligation to control and chastise his wife through physical force. Id. at 430-
31.
In the modem context, Gordon asserts that "violence among family members
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In many quarters, a low level of domestic violence is still seen as
acceptable32 or at least as a mutual problem in the relationship.3 3 On the
other hand, men who seriously injure or kill their partners are seen as
criminals, not as part of a larger social problem.34 Abusive relationships,
however, need to be seen as part of a larger cultural dynamic. This
dynamic defines individual ideas about appropriate gender roles which
affect behavior within marital/romantic/sexual relationships. Only from this
perspective can one recognize the features of our culture's dominant gender
roles, held by both men and women, that foster domestic violence in
American society.
In more common parlance, one must answer two questions about
domestic violence. First, the most common query: Why do women remain
in relationships that are unsatisfying, harmful, and even life-threatening? 35
The second question, less commonly asked (which in itself says a great
arises from family conflicts which are not only historically influenced but political in
themselves, in the sense of that word as having to do with power relations. Family
violence usually arises out of power struggles in which individuals are contesting real
resources and benefits." GORDON, supra note 13, at 3. For example, "[bleatings kept
women from leaving, kept them providing sexual, housework, and child care services
(or were intended to do so)." Id. at 287.
32 Natalie L. Clark, Crime Begins at Home: Let's Stop Punishing Victims and
Perpetuating Violence, 28 WM. & MARYL. REv. 263, 264 (1987); Dobash & Dobash,
supra note 31.
33 Elizabeth Topliffe, Why Civil Protection Orders Are Effective Remedies for
Domestic Violence but Mutual Protective Orders Are Not, 67 IND. L.J. 1039, 1060-61
(1992). Furthermore, modern developments such as industrialization and urbanization
have weakened traditional informal controls over unacceptable levels of marital
violence. See GORDON, supra note 13, at 279 (more traditional cultures had "[rlituals
of public shaming, known as charivari, skimmington rides, rough music, and misrules,
among many other names, involving costumes and floats, dancing, singing rude songs,
and, sometimes, physical punishment. [These] were common from the fifteenth
through the nineteenth century.... Some similar activity in the United States in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been discovered."). See generally FAMILY
VIOLENCE, AN INTERNATIONAL AND INTERDISCIPLINARY STuDY 69 (John M. Eekelaar
and Sanford N. Katz eds., 1978).
34 See SCHECHTER, supra note 13, at 210-13 (noting that it is important to see the
violence as part of society, not an individual or inter-generational psychological
problem).
35 The question is often most succinctly phrased as, "Why does she stay?" See
Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to Battering: Understanding
the Problem, Forging the Solution, 60 WASH. L. REv. 267, 279 (1985); P.B.
Poorman, Why Does She Stay? 59 (1980) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
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deal about our culture's dominant gender role stereotypes), is: Why do
men batter?36
For women, one must recognize that they too have bought into the
social myths that legitimize the violence-be it through religion,37 law, or
the norms of friendships, kinships, and neighborhood groups. 38 "One
assault does not make a battered woman; she becomes one because of her
socially determined inability to resist or escape." 39 Lack of self-confidence
and a traditionalist view about family and the feminine role 40 also figure
prominently in a battered woman's psychological profile.41
In addition to women's conceptions about themselves generally, there
is also a dynamic to the abusive relationship that hinders external efforts to
control domestic violence. Unlike stranger-on-stranger crime, after which
the parties have little or no contact, domestic violence takes place in a
relationship to which both parties often remain committed. 42 Women in
particular resist outside intervention when they believe that it threatens the
future of the relationship. 43 This is especially true for women who define
their self-image in terms of their relationships with men.44 Further, violent
relationships sometimes follow an internal cycle of tension building,
release, and reconciliation. 45 The victim may therefore be less willing to
36 See Waits, supra note 35, at 286.
37 Sewell, supra note 14, at 986-87.
38 GORDON, supra note 13, at 285.
39 Id. at 285.
40 Waits, supra note 35, at 285.
41 GORDON, supra note 13, at 272.
42 It has also been argued that all women are socialized to stay with their
husbands regardless of their partners' problems. For example, only ten percent of
non-alcoholic women leave their alcoholic husbands, while ninety percent of non-
alcoholic men leave their alcoholic wives. Similar statistics have been found in
marriages involving a partner with a degenerative disease. Telephone Interview with
Joan Zorza, Senior Attorney at the National Center on Women & Family Law, New
York, N.Y. (Apr. 11, 1995). Battered women frequently state that they want to stay
with the batterer, but that they just want the abuse to end. Interview with Linda
Osmundson, Director of the CASA Shelter in St. Petersburg, Florida (Mar. 25, 1995).
See also infra note 146 discussing differences between men and women's conceptions
of relationships and conflict resolution.
43 See Waits, supra note 35, at 281-82, 286.
44 BEVERLY BALOs & MARY L. FELLOWS, LAW & VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN:
CASES AND MATERIALS ON SYSTEMS OF OPPRESSION 219 (1994). See James B. Boskey,
Spousal Abuse in the United States: The Attorney's Role, in FAMILY VIOLENCE, AN
INTERNATIONAL AND INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY, supra note 30, at 202, 205. But cf.
WALKER, supra note 13, at 80.
45 See Michele Ingrassia & Melinda Beck, Patterns of Abuse, NEWSWEEK, July 4,
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take advantage of intervention offered during a peaceful phase.46 Finally,
while a woman initially might be strong enough to escape, ongoing expo-
sure to physical and emotional damage can eventually make it difficult for
the victim alone to solve the problem. 47
In addition to these psychological factors, it cannot be stressed enough
that critical economic forces are at work as well. Domestic violence often
starts slowly or only after marriage48 and children, 49 when leaving presents
greater legal and pragmatic obstacles. As long as men continue to earn
more than women and women continue to bear the primary burden of child
care, male batterers can exert economic coercion,50 especially since many
victims are unskilled and have young children.51 While domestic abuse
crosses all economic and class boundaries,52 the poor, young, less edu-
cated, and unemployed are more likely to have abusive relationships, much
1994, at 26, 30-31. Lenore Walker describes three parts to the abuse cycle: "a phase
where tension is building and the woman tries desperately to keep the man calm; an
explosion with acute battering, and then a period where the batterer is loving and
contrite." Id. The cycle of battering, remorse and wooing behavior wears women
down until they become "brainwashed" into thinking that leaving is impossible. Id.;
see WALKER, supra note 13, at 55-70 (describing in greater detail her cycle theory of
violence). However, experts now downplay Walker's cyclical theory of battering,
since more recent empirical research suggests it is found only in some battering
relationships. Instead, the focus has shifted to the manipulative, opportunistic behavior
of the batterer, who seeks to maintain the relationship through whatever means
necessary, without regard to a specific timing cycle unique to a battering relationship.
Interview with Linda Osmundson, Director of the CASA Shelter in St. Petersburg,
Florida (Mar. 25, 1995).
46 Although many battered women who are able to leave the relationship are later
able to establish healthier relationships, some studies suggest that the success rate for
resolving domestic violence within a chronically violent relationship is very low no
matter what interventions are used.
47 Ingrassia & Beck, supra note 45, at 31.
48 See Dobash & Dobash, supra note 31, at 432.
49 See GORDON, supra note 13, at 272.
50 See S. REP No. 164, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1991), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 133, 137.
51 One battered women's advocate in the Philadelphia area states that most of her
clients "often have two or three small children, are in their late 20s or early 30s, have
few or no job skills, and have been abused three to five years." Tina Kelley, Violence
on the Home Front, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 21, 1990, at C4.
52 It is well established that domestic violence occurs in families and relationships
of all ages, communities, income levels, races, religions, employment situations, and
marital status. See WALKER, supra note 13, at 17; Ingrassia & Beck, supra note 45, at
28.
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as they are to suffer from other societal ills. 53 Finally, the poverty, drugs,
and alcohol that create dysfunctional families are breeding grounds for
batterers and their potential victims. 54 Programs targeted at domestic
violence will run aground if they do not account for the other economic
and social problems of many of its victims. 55
As significant as female gender roles and economic restraints may be,
current research suggests that the long-neglected male gender role is at
least as significant a contributor to domestic violence. 56 Most batterers in
53 The assertion that incidences of battering occur more frequently in lower or
working-class families than in upper-class families is debatable given the disincentive
for upper-class women to report the crime. ROGER LANGLEY & RICHARD C. LEVY,
WIFEBEATING: THE SILENT CRISIS 43-46 (1977).
54 See generally GORDON, supra note 13, at 264-66. Some research now disputes
the role of alcohol in triggering abuse, finding that it is more of a precipitating event
than a cause. Id. at 265. In addition, the myth that sexual disagreements were a cause
of violence has also been challenged. Id. at 269-71.
55 The military offers a microcosm of this effect. Domestic violence in the
military has increased steadily since the late 1980s and has become so severe that an
average of one spouse or child a week is killed by a relative in uniform. Some of the
rise can be attributed to better reporting, but other suggested causes are shrinking
military budgets, incomes, and prospects for career advancement, as well as rising
tension over more frequent deployments. Eric Schmitt, Military Struggling to Stem an
Increase in Family Violence, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1994, at 1; Marc Thompson, The
Living Room War, TIME, May 23, 1994, at 48.
It may be that different solutions may be appropriate for different classes of
batterers, not just by psychological profile, but by economic class and employment
status as well. See Lawrence W. Sherman, he Influence of Criminology on Criminal
Law: Evaluating Arrests for Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 25 (1992) (finding that arrests for domestic violence tends to deter
only employed suspects); Developments in the Law-Legal Responses to Domestic
Violence, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1501, 1539 (1993) [hereinafter Developments] (noting
that mandatory arrest studies seem to show that unemployed criminal batterers are
least responsive to arrest-oriented enforcement because arrest does not deter them).
56 Waits, supra note 35 at 286; Daniel G. Saunders, Husbands Who Assault, in
LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT 11-13 (N. Zoe Hilton ed. 1993). While battered
women often suffer from low self-esteem, come from an abusive family, abuse alcohol
and drugs, remain passive in relationships, become dependent and isolated, and crave
approval, attention and affection, some research suggests that it may be that a violent
relationship has less to do with the woman herself as with the man with whom she
ends up. Ingrassia & Beck, supra note 45, at 28-29. But see Gerald T. Hotaling &
David B. Sugarman, Prevention of Wife Assault, in TREATMENT OF FAMILY VIOLENCE:
A SouRCE BOOK 385, 401 (Robert T. Ammerman & Michel Hersen eds., 1990)
(noting that exposure to violence while growing up does not predict whether a woman
will be abused as an adult).
1995] 1163
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
some way reflect or carry out a model of male behavior that they learned
from their parents and upon which they act when challenged.5 7
Society has taught men to assert dominance in their relationships, both
within and outside the family.58 Second, some level of violence or at least
a willingness to engage in violence can be a respected male quality. 59
Third, family matters are private-for the man, the home constitutes "his
castle" where he can retreat from work and competition with other men.60
Accordingly, batterers do not accept that their behavior is wrong or that
society has any right to interfere in their conduct of personal
relationships.61
More specifically, researchers are finding that there are different
profiles for batterers cutting across all strata of society. 62 Some research
divides batterers into two groups, dominant and dependent. The dominant
batterer is generally aggressive with society, more severely violent and
more likely to have experienced violence in childhood. 63 The dependent
batterer is violent only in the family and tends to show more remorse. 64
57 Waits, supra note 35, at 288; LANGLEY & LEVY, supra note 53, at 49.
58 Any behavior or perceived challenges to the man's possession, authority, and
control can trigger a violent episode. Dobash & Dobash, supra note 31, at 438-39.
Trivial things like a late meal or talking to another man, though individually
inexplicable as "causes," are better understood in the context of maintaining authority.
Id. at 439.
59 Dobash & Dobash, supra note 31, at 434. However, "[c]ontrary to what might
be expected, anger and hostility are not consistently related to violence. Some men
may act not out of anger but out a sense of a 'duty to discipline' their wife." Saunders,
supra note 56 at 15.
60David G. Gil, Societal Violence and Violence in Families, in FAMILY
VIOLENCE, AN INTERNATIONAL AND INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY, supra note 30, at
14,16.
61 Gail Goolkasian, Recent Developments: Judging Domestic Violence, 10 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.. 275, 283 (1987). Now that the focus has turned to men, some batterers
are trying to portray themselves as victims, joining the ever larger number of groups
huddling under the victimization label. See Developments, supra note 55, at 1523
(condemning this approach and arguing that "[any treatment must be coupled with
and forcefully convey blame and public disapproval" and strict punishment which
"dispels any lingering myths of society's acceptance of wife beating or exaggerated
and antiquated notions of family privacy."); see also infra text accompanying notes
148-57 for a discussion of empowerment and "victim talk."
62 David B. Mitchell, Contemporary Police Practices in Domestic Violence Cases:
Arresting the Abuser: Is It Enough?, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 241, 244 (1992).
63 Saunders, supra note 56, at 18.
64 Id. at 18-19.
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Other psychologists divide batterers into three types of batterers.6 5 The
first is the infrequent batterer who does not escalate to serious episodes of
violence. 66  The violent behavior usually results from lack of
communication skills and particular social stresses.6 7 The second is the
repetitive abuser whose irrational jealousy, fear of abandonment, and an
unwillingness to share power in the relationship cause the violent actions.68
Such batterers often grew up as the victims of, or witnesses to, abuse. 69
The third type is the anti-social batterer whose abuse is part of a larger
pattern of violence and who, frighteningly, often becomes calmer during
the attack. 70
2. Gender Roles and Institutional Actors
Social attitudes toward domestic violence affect not only the batterer
and his victim, but also their families and the social institutions with which
they come into contact, particularly the institutional actors with the most
daily contact with domestic violence. Many police officers, prosecutors,
judges, and social workers were raised and acculturated when a certain
level of domestic violence was perceived as acceptable behavior, or at least
as a private matter in which societal institutions should play no role.71
These individuals are susceptible to letting their daily exposure to domestic
violence reinforce stereotypes rather than challenge them.
For example, police training under federal grants from the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA)72 in the 1960s encouraged
65 JENNIFER B. FLEMING, STOPPING WIFE ABUSE (1979); EDWARD W. GONDOLF,
MEN WHO BATTER: AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH FOR STOPPING WIFE ABUSE (1985);
James Ptacek, Why Do Men Batter Their Wives, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE
ABUSE 133-57 (Kersti Yllo and Michele Bograd eds. 1988); Ingrassia & Beck, supra
note 45, at 29-30 (discussing the work of Indiana University psychologist Amy
Holtzworth-Munroe).
66 Ingrassia & Beck, supra note 45, at 32.
67 Id. But see Margarethe Hyden, Verbal Aggression as Prehistory of Woman
Battering, 10 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 55, 69 (1995).
68 Ingrassia & Beck, supra note 45, at 32.
69 Id.
70 This last category of hard-core abusers, representing 10-20% of all batterers,
seems beyond the reach of any therapy. Ingrassia & Beck, supra note 45, at 32.
71 Janell Schmidt and Ellen H. Steury, Prosecutorial Discretion in Filing Charges
in Domestic Violence Cases, 27 CRMNOLOGY 487, 488 (1989).
72 The LEAA has provided special initiatives in the areas of domestic violence,
including local police officer training in domestic violence crisis intervention. See
DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 14, at 161; see also Sewell, supra note 14, at 1000,
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the existing police practices of non-arrest, diversion, and the most minimal
response to domestic violence situations.73 Psychiatry, and the social work
policies it influenced, has been criticized for blaming domestic violence, in
part, on female masochism. 74
Further, institutional actors have been reluctant to get involved, even
after policy and legislative reforms. For example, at the patrol level,
officers have resisted implementing mandatory arrest laws. 75 Various
reasons have been given: the belief that such situations are dangerous to
police officers, 76 sexism by a still overwhelmingly male profession, and
n.125. These programs have been criticized for reinforcing established police attitudes
rather than changing attitudes. DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 14, at 163.
73 See EvE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAwA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE
CHANGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 31 (1990); DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 14,
at 161-64; MURRAY A. STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE
AMERICAN FAMILY 232-34 (1980); GAIL A. GOOLKASIAN, CONFRONTING DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: A GUIDE FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES, ISSUES AND PRACTICE IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 29 (National Institute of Justice, May 1986). Even police training
manuals had a clear non-arrest policy of abusers in the 1970s. See, e.g., Zorza, supra
note 20, at 48-49 (describing police practices in Michigan). This non-arrest policy
"was endorsed by the American Bar Association, whose 1973 Standards for the Urban
Police Function said that police should 'engage in the resolution of conflict such as
that which occurs between husband and wife... without reliance upon criminal
assault or disorderly conduct statutes.'" Sherman, supra note 55, at 10 (quoting ABA,
PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR THE URBAN POLICE
FUNCTION 12 (1973)).
74 Lisa G. Lerman, The Decontextualization of Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY, 217, 218-20 (1992). According to the Freudians, therefore, the
prescribed solution was treatment in which the victim was forced to accept at least half
the blame. PLECK, supra note 14, at 145-46. This attitude survives in the approach of
some social scientists and practitioners who believe that mutual counseling is the best
course for couples experiencing continued episodes of violence because each is at
fault. Ingrassia & Beck, supra note 45, at 32.
75 A specific example is New York where although there is a mandatory arrest
law and a requirement that the officer file a report for every incident, a 1993 study
found that of 200,000 calls, reports were filed in only 30% and arrests in only 7% of
the cases. Ingrassia & Beck, supra note 45, at 28; see DONALD G. DUTTON, THE
DOMESTIC ASSAULT OF WOMEN: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIvES
139, 143-44 (1988); Sarah M. Buel, Recent Developments, Mandatory Arrest for
Domestic Violence, 11 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 213 (1988); Zorza, supra note 20, at 65.
76 Waits, supra note 35, at 314. Though unsupported by statistics, police believe
that domestic dispute calls result in "more assaults on policemen than any other kind
of encounter." Parnas, supra note 12, at 113 (citing U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE; THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY 92, 104 (1967)). However, one study found that while domestic disturbances
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traditional notions about family. 77 Police departments are not the only
institutions that have failed to implement the laws enacted to protect
battered women. Criminal prosecution rates are still stunningly low. 78
Prosecutors often place the blame on the failure of many victims to press
charges79 or to cooperate with the prosecution.80 Finally, the courts have
account for 30% of all police calls, they account for only 5.7% of police deaths.
Zorza, supra note 20, at 52 (citing Joel Gardner & Elizabeth Clemmer, Danger to
Police in Domestic Disturbances-A New Look, in RESEARCH IN BRIEF 5 (National
Institute of Justice, Nov. 1986)). On the other hand, this study did investigate less
serious injuries in domestic cases versus other police-citizen contacts. Nevertheless,
advocates argue that better officer training can reduce the risk of assault during a
domestic incident. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 73, at 108.
77 Waits, supra note 35, at 311-14. While these factors are important, the
bureaucratic nature of police departments is of at least equal importance. Police
departments are resistant to change, particularly after years of non-arrest policies and
hostile to limits on their traditional discretion. See LANGLEY & LEVY, supra note 53,
at 168-72 (recounting anecdotal stories of police personnel and official policy of non-
arrest for domestic disputes). See infra text accompanying notes 124-30 for a
discussion of the need to adopt new programs to attack domestic violence within the
existing institutional framework and value structure.
78 Most domestic violence cases never make it to trial. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA,
supra note 73, at 58 (noting that as many as 80% of domestic violence cases never
make it to trial); Rhea Mandulo, Programs Aim at Keeping Abuse Cases Alive, N.Y.
L.J., Jan. 6, 1993, at 2 (same for the Manhattan and Bronx areas in New York);
Trevor Jensen, Domestic Court Gets Rocky Start, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale,
Florida), Oct. 23, 1994, at 1B (reporting that a "high rate" of domestic assault cases
in Dade County were dropped because the victims refused to pursue the charges);
Deborah Nelson & Rebecca Carr, Some Frustrated Victims Talk of Taking Up Arns,
CHI. SuN-TIMES, July 24, 1994, at 18 (reporting that "[olut of 10,700 battery cases
filed in domestic violence court in Chicago in the last year, 7,400 have been dropped
so far").
79 Parnas, supra note 12, at 111. As a group, prosecutors still think that a
majority of victims do not want to prosecute. Ingrassia & Beck, supra note 45, at 28
(quoting Mimi Rose, chief of Family Violence and Assault Unit, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania). One of the reasons women will not prosecute may be embedded in the
nature of the problem. Due to both the manipulative nature of the batterer and the
cyclical pattern of violence followed by kindness, many victims are persuaded to drop
the charges. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text; see also SCHAFRAN, supra
note 25, at 49 (citing additional reasons).
However, the criminal justice system does not make it easy for a woman to keep
her resolve. For example, in Chicago, of the over 19,000 domestic violence
defendants who appeared in Cook County Domestic Violence courtrooms in 1989,
only 87 were given jail terms. Only 1,331 were even convicted. The vast majority of
cases were dismissed, usually because the victims, who were required to come to
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contributed to the characterization of domestic violence as a family
matter. 81 As a substitute for firmer sanctions, judges often use a stem
lecture from the bench, 82 probation, or referral for counseling. 83
Therefore, gender role stereotypes toward domestic violence have hindered
efforts to make social institutions more responsive.
court every two weeks until the defendant showed up, eventually failed to return to
court. Burleigh, supra note 26, at 2.
80 Waits, supra note 35, at 321-27. As with the police, however, institutional
factors are also at work. For prosecutors, such cases lack the prestige associated with
drug, murder, or white-collar crime cases. In addition, many domestic violence
charges are misdemeanors relegated to the most inexperienced and overworked
prosecutors. See LANGLEY & LEvY, supra note 53, at 163 (noting that most prose-
cutors think their careers will not be enhanced by prosecuting domestic violence
cases); U.S. COMM'N ON CivI. RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB: BATTERED
WOMEN AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 93 (1982) [hereinafter RULE OF THUMB]
(describing the low priority prosecutors place on spousal abuse complaints); Laurie
Woods, Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women, 5 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1979).
See infra notes 244-51 and accompanying text discussing prosecutors' institutional
interests.
81 Waits, supra note 35, at 327-28. Judges are often insensitive, showing
particular impatience with women who show emotion before the bench. Kin Kinports
& Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases: An Empirical
Assessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 163, 207
(1993).
82 Waits, supra note 35, at 328.
83 Early in domestic violence reform, counseling was seen as a way to weed out
the heavy case load. For example, prosecution was often deferred until after a
showing that mediation had failed. Parnas, supra note 12, at 111. Mediation and
counseling as primary solutions continue to be heavily criticized. Lerman says
mediation and counseling are not helpful because they ignore "criminality of the
abuser's behavior and reinforces his control within the relationship." Lerman, supra
note 74, at 220; see also AMA, DIAGNOSTIC & TREATMENT GUIDELINES ON DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE 12 (Mar. 1992) (noting that counseling for couples is not recommended if
domestic violence is present); Zorza supra note 20, at 72, 72 & n.235 (noting that
family counseling and mediation are known to increase domestic violence). But
mediation and counseling still have their advocates; Developments, supra note 55, at
1541-43 (describing the advantages and disadvantages of diverting the batterer to a
counseling program). The better view is that mediation and counseling only work, if at
all, in conjunction with the real threat of prosecution and criminal penalties.
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C. Twenty Years of Domestic Violence Reforms: Strengths and
Weaknesses
1. An Overview
Viewed from this historical84 and sociological perspective, it is less
surprising that domestic violence has proven difficult to overcome in only
twenty years of social and legal reform. Nevertheless, it is important to
briefly review the history of domestic violence reform to determine why
these efforts have not better addressed the underlying cultural attitudes.
The primary response is that at least initially, the scope of needed
reform was simply so overwhelming that consideration of this issue was at
times both unrecognized and premature. For example, when advocates
began the current phase of domestic violence reform in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, social services such as shelters and other emergency assistance
had to be established and funded from scratch. 85 Legal reformers were in a
similar position. They had to eliminate the most blatant, overt forms of
societal approval for domestic violence such as the marital rape exception86
and spousal testimonial immunity.8 7 In the criminal justice system, the lack
84 Gordon divides society's approach to domestic violence into five stages over
the past 100 years. In the late 19th Century, general charitable organizations and
moral reform groups, influenced by early feminism, first addressed the issue. The
Progressive Era (1910-30) followed with the incorporation of family violence work
into professional social work. There was a strong focus on the poor and on intrusive
state regulation. The Depression marked a radical de-emphasis on family violence.
The rebirth of attention in the 1940-50s had a heavy reliance on psychiatric categories
and "pro-family" values. Finally, the feminist movement of the 1960-70s opened up a
critique of family and an attack on the underlying roots of family violence. GORDON,
supra note 13, at 19-26. In fact, defining wife beating as a social problem, not as
characteristics of specific violent individuals or relationships, was one of the first great
achievements of the feminist movement. Id. at 251; see DOBASH & DOBASH, supra
note 14, at 156-57 (noting that in the late 19th Century the concern for battered
women emerged because of the work of the early feminists, but it was cloaked in the
context of social purity and temperance groups).
85 Even now, most shelters are inadequately funded and overcrowded. MAJORITY
STAFF OF SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., 102D CONG., 2D SESS., VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN: A WEEK IN THE LIFE OF AMERICA 39 (1992); see also Developments, supra
note 55, at 1506-09 (noting that "[s]helters are typically underfunded, understaffed,
and unable to respond fully to the needs of battered women"). Id. at 1506.
86 See Abigail A. Tierney, Spousal Sexual Assault: Pennsylvania's Place on the
Sliding Scale of Protection from Marital Rape, 90 DICK. L. REv. 777 (1986).
87 Interspousal immunity was used to prevent victims from testifying against their
batterers. As early as 1910, Justice Harlan criticized spousal immunity for torts
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of any front line response by the police was initially attacked with class
action and other civil suits, which prompted some institutional reforms.88
State legislatures then stepped in and also mandated changes in police
procedures, including items so basic as to require police to file a report for
every domestic call. 89
However, when reformers did turn to more proactive legislation, there
was also in retrospect sometimes an unrealistic hope that a "magic bullet"
remedy could be found for each problem area. In the civil arena, one of the
first developments was to authorize family courts to issue civil protection
orders to victims of domestic violence. 90 A civil protection order91 is "a
legally binding court order that prohibits an individual who has committed
an act of domestic violence from further abusing the victim."92 The
between spouses. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 619-24 (1910) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). Prior to the 1970s, only about 16 states had abolished the doctrine. By
1993, 49 states had fully or partially nullified interspousal immunity, effectively
allowing a woman to sue for assault or battery. Laura H. Wanamaker, Note, Waite v.
Waite: The Florida Supreme Court Abrogates the Doctrine of Interspousal Immunity,
45 MERCER L. REv. 903, 905-07 (1994). Interspousal homicide is most likely where
marital rape has occurred. Zorza, supra note 20, at 51.
88 See DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 14, at 165-68; Sewell, supra note 14, at
1006-08. However, the continued use of civil tort actions has been criticized as
ineffective against all but wealthy defendants. See Andrea Benneke, Civil Rights for
Battered Women: Axiomatic & Ignored, 11 LAw & INEQ. J. 1, 35 (1992).
89 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 23, at 237 (describing the policy in New
Jersey).
90 See 1976 PA. LAWS 1090; 1978 MASS. ACTS 447.
91 Civil protection orders are known by a variety of names: restraining orders,
see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.010 (1991); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-102
(West 1989 & Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.718 (1990 & Supp 1994); no-
contact orders, see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.040 (West 1990 & Supp.
1995); or abuse orders, see, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1104 (1989 & Supp.
1994); injunctions, see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West Supp. 1995); MICH.
Cow. LAws ANN. § 600.2950 (West 1986). For consistency, I will call them "civil
protection orders."
9 2 PETER FINN & SARAH COLSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION
ORDERS: LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT at v (1990).
There are two types of civil protection orders, ex parte and permanent. Peter Finn,
Statutory Authority in the Use and Enforcement of Civil Protection Orders Against
Domestic Abuse, 23 FAM. L.Q. 43, 43 (1989). Ex parte orders are granted by the
courts for emergency situations in which immediate protection is needed. Id.
Permanent (or full) protection orders are granted after a full adversarial court hearing.
Id. As discussed in more detail below, these early protection orders were often limited
in scope and availability and usually lacked effective enforcement methods. See infra
text accompanying notes 181-82.
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significance of such orders as the foundation for the recognition and
protection of domestic violence victims should not be underestimated. 93
However, the statutes authorizing these orders did not contain sufficient
civil or criminal tools to enforce them. 94
To some extent, the same lack of follow-through legislation was true
when battered women advocates sought relief through the criminal justice
system. For example, some reformers concentrated solely on increased
criminal penalties for domestic violence. 95 However, the best example of
the "magic bullet" approach was the mandatory arrest stampede of the
1980s.
2. The Mandatory Arrest Studies
A widely publicized study of police behavior in Minneapolis,
Minnesota published in 1984,96 revealed that police officers usually failed
93 Every jurisdiction provides that spouses are eligible for protection orders. FINN
& COLSON, supra note 92, at 46. About half of the states provide protection for
unrelated household members. Id.
94 Even today, violators of civil protection orders often are not immediately
arrested and sanctioned. See FINN & COLSON, supra note 92, at 49. "For enforcement
to work, the courts need to monitor compliance, victims must report violations, and,
most of all, police, prosecutors, and judges should respond sternly to violations that
are reported. These conditions were not in place in most of the jurisdictions examined
for this report." Id.; see also FINN & COLSON, supra note 92, at 58 (cautioning that
women should not assume that a violation of a protective order will result in
immediate removal of the batterer by police, because state statutes may not allow
police to arrest him before a hearing or a warrant is issued).
95 See Parnas, supra note 12, at 118, 153-57 (discussing the full enforcement
approach through the criminal law and the limits of this strategy). An example of this
approach is the use of so-called "no-drop" policies under which requests by the victim
of a battering to drop the case are denied. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 741.2901 (Supp.
1994); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.0311 (West 1991 & Supp. 1994); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 968.075(7) (Supp. 1994). Many individual state attorneys' offices have also
instituted "no-drop" policies. Corsilles, supra note 13, 863-65. See infra note 253 for
discussion of the weaknesses of "no-drop" prosecution policies. On the other hand,
criminal law reform efforts have led to the creation of anti-stalking laws which fill a
critical hole in the protection of psychologically and physically battered women. See
Robert P. Faulkner & Douglas H. Hsiao, And Where You Go I'll Follow: The
Constitutionality of Antistalking Laws and Proposed Model Legislation, 31 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 1, 2 & n.3 (1993) (at least 43 states now have statutes designed to protect
women against stalking).
96 The findings of the Minnesota study, called the "Minneapolis Domestic
Violence Experiment," first appeared in Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk,
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to arrest batterers, even when there was an official policy encouraging
arrest. Social scientists suggested that this resistance was generated by,
among other things, police officers' personal attitudes about domestic
violence, their beliefs about the failure of complainants to prosecute, and
the lack of institutional support for such cases from prosecutors. 97 The
Minneapolis study's finding that only ten percent of big city police
departments even encouraged the arrest of batterers9s led to widespread
calls for mandatory arrest legislation requiring police to arrest whenever
there was probable cause to believe a battery had occurred. 99 Mandatory
arrest law advocates theorized that if batterers were arrested in greater
numbers, they would be deterred from future battering. 1°°
In response, sixteen states now mandate an arrest when there is
probable cause to believe a domestic assault has occurred,101 and other
states significantly expanded police powers to make misdemeanor arrests in
domestic violence cases.1 02 However, despite the reported benefits of
mandatory arrest laws in some situations,10 3 recent follow-up studies
suggest less than encouraging results from mandatory arrest policies. 104
The Spe-cfic Effects of Arrests for Domestic Assaults, 49 AM. Soc. REv. 261 (1984).
97 See Developments, supra note 55, at 1535-36.
98 This study was conducted on the eve of the release of the Minneapolis report
by one of its authors. Sherman, supra note 55, at 23.
99 Developments, supra note 55, at 1536. In response to the Minneapolis report,
the U.S. Attorney General recommended arrest as the standard police procedure to
domestic assault and it was this recommendation that seems to have propelled the
policy. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GEN. 'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE:
FINAL REPORT 17-24 (1984) [hereinafter U.S. TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE].
However, the authors of the Minneapolis study recommended only a presumption for
arrest, not a mandatory policy. Sherman, supra note 55, at 21.
10 Waits, supra note 35, at 316; see also Lisa Lerman, A Model State Act:
Remedies for Domestic Abuse, 21 HARV. I. ON LEGIS. 61, 130 (1984).
101 Domestic Violence Fact Sheet (National Center on Women and Family Law,
Inc. 1994). Maryland is the most recent state to join this group.
102 Developments, supra note 55, at 1537 n.68.
103 An example would be the prevention of further serious violence during a
critical battering episode. Developments, supra note 55, at 1537-38 (describing
benefits of mandatory arrest laws).
104 Parnas, supra note 12, at 150-51. Follow-up studies indicate that arrest alone
will not deter the woman's batterer. See, e.g., Franklin W. Dunford et al., The Role
of Arrest in Domestic Assault: The Omaha Police Experiment, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 183
(1990); 1. David Hirschel & Ira W. Hutchison, Ill, Female Spouse Abuse and the
Police Response: The Charlotte North Carolina Experiment, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY, 73, 115 (1992); Lawrence W. Sherman, et al., From Initial Deterrence
to Long-Term Escalation: Short Custody Arrest for Poverty Ghetto Domestic Violence,
1172 [Vol. 56:1153
EMPOWERING THE BA7TERED WOMAN
For example, researchers did not find a deterrent effect in every city
studied. 10 5 Further, deterrence was significantly affected by the batterer's
employment status. 10 The lower down the economic ladder, the less effect
a mandatory arrest had on future behavior.10 7 In some cities, mandatory
arrest policies actually worsened recidivism over time. 10 8 Some studies
suggested that an arrest could backfire against the victim by provoking
additional assaults after the batterer was released. 10 9
In retrospect, it is not surprising that arrest alone does not work
effectively. As one researcher eloquently remarked:
The world is all too full of aggressive, impulsive individuals who are
willing to take risks in order to vent their temper or get their way. They
are often poorly educated and lack solid judgment and planning skills.
[Many have no interest in protecting] their reputations or arrest histories.
Some are often intoxicated or under the influence of drugs ... others have
grown so depressed or bitter that they simply don't care anymore. These
types of individuals are not impressed by the risk of short-term
incarceration, although for some of them, genuinely harsh sanctions such
29 CRIMINOLOGY 821 (1991). However, in response to the anti-mandatory arrest data
now coming out, Lerman argues that these new studies are myopic and ignore the
experience of battered women. She states that while studies of arrest policies can
provide valuable information, they focus only on this facet of a social problem and
result in a "test tube attitude." Lerman, supra note 74, at 218-19. Experiments need
to take into account many other factors, such as the context of the arrest, behavior of
police officers, how the case is prosecuted, the victim's wishes, and the kind of sanc-
tions imposed. Id.; see also Cynthia G. Bowman, The Arrest Experiments: A Feminist
Critique, 83 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1201 (1992) (noting that the problem overall
with quantitative research is that it divorces factors from their "socio-economic and
historical context").
105 Hirschel, supra note 104, at 117.
106 Dunford, supra note 104, at 184; Sherman, supra note 55, at 25.
107 Perhaps because an arrest would have little or no impact if the batterer is
unemployed or seeks only low skill jobs which do not require a background check.
See Sherman, supra note 55, at 25.
108 Id. at 30-31. It has also been argued that the results of the original Minnesota
study were simply not strong enough on which to base national policy. The critics of
the study cited such negative factors as sparse victim interview data and limited
sample size and makeup of that sample. Id. at 20. But see Joan Zorza, Must We Stop
Arresting Batterers?: Analysis and Policy Implications of New Policy Domestic
Violence Studies, 28 Naw ENG. L. Rnv. 929 (1994) (arguing that arrest is the superior
method of deterring domestic violence and criticizing the follow-up studies to the
Minneapolis experiment).
109 See Developments, supra note 55, at 1538-40. However, this is more likely
the result if the batterer believes that the system will not ultimately punish him.
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as lengthy prison sentences may have deterrent value. 110
For these batterers, a short-term arrest will have little deterrent effect
on their willingness to commit another act of domestic violence, just as a
short term arrest has relatively little effect at preventing their participation
in other crimes. 111 For many of these reasons, feminists themselves have
come to criticize over-reliance on mandatory arrest policies,1 12 recognizing
that many batterers have too much invested in their abusive treatment of
their female counterparts to fear arrest alone. 113
On an institutional level, mandatory arrest laws were also flawed
because they tried to eliminate institutional resistance by the police by fiat.
Proponents failed to recognize that on a practical level, mandatory arrest
policies impose significant administrative costs on police. Mandatory
policies for agencies, such as police departments, that normally rely
heavily on individual discretion can quickly backfire, causing resentment
and efforts to undermine dramatic behavioral changes. 114 The most
110 Mitchell, supra note 62, at 243. One should not necessarily read this quote to
mean that the domestic abuse problem is one primarily of the lower classes, only that
certain classes of batterers are harder to deter. Arrest does appear to have a deterrent
effect on employed batterers, perhaps due to social pressures and particular
characteristics of the communities in which they live. See Sherman, supra note 55, at
35. However, the fact that "unemployed, socially marginal batterers are not deterred
by arrest" should not be surprising. Many burglars, robbers, and drug dealers commit
more crimes after they are released, so we cannot assume that arrest would deter
batterers from future violence. Lisa A. Frisch, Research That Succeeds, Policies That
Fail, 83 J. CRiM. L. & CRMINOLOGy 209, 213 (1992).
111 Mitchell, supra note 62, at 243.
112 Miriam H. Ruttenberg, A Feminist Critique of Mandatory Arrest: An Analysis
of Race and Gender in Domestic Violence Policy, 2 AM. U.I. GENDER & L. 171, 191-
92 (1994) (arguing that mandatory arrest laws will have a negative impact on African-
Americans because of bias in the criminal justice system toward them).
113 Bowman, supra note 104, at 201-04. Some feminists also caution that it is
dangerous simply to ask, "Does arrest work?" If the answer is no, then the response is
to do away with a policy that police do not like anyway. They prefer to pose a larger
question: "Do arrest, prosecution and support services work?" Id. Unfortunately, not
enough communities have invested enough resources to implement such a coordinated
approach.
While I support the comprehensive approach, given tight resources, advocates
must resist calls for broad mandatory policies. In the context of arrest policy, this
Article suggests restricting mandatory arrests to batterers who have violated an
outstanding protection order. See infra text accompanying notes 121-22.
114 Moreover, front line service providers in large bureaucratic organizations are
adept at circumventing unwelcome policy changes. See, e.g., Kathleen J. Ferraro,
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dramatic example has been the practice of police to arrest both the woman
and man if there was any evidence of physical resistance by the woman
during the altercation. 115
Additionally, mandatory arrest policies alone fail to deter batterers due
to the lack of action further along in the criminal justice pipeline. Even
when police arrest under a mandatory law,116 courts still generally
immediately release those arrested.' 17 When the police must arrest, the
discretionary decision to drop weak cases simply is passed to
prosecutors. 118 When criminal charges are filed, crowded dockets delay
action and misdemeanors are given low priority, leading to dismissals
when victims become frustrated and drop the charges. Finally, even in the
cases that go to trial, juries and judges do not convict often enough or
punish severely enough to deter future acts. So long as the penalties for
domestic violence are neither swift nor certain, arrests alone will not break
the violent dynamic in which both are trapped.' 1 9
Policing Woman Battering, 36 Soc. PROB. 61, 63-64 (1989) (finding that after the
Phoenix Police Department adopted a mandatory arrest policy, patrol officers made
arrests in only 43 % of the cases in which the officer had probable cause and the
offender was present).
Patrol officers' chief complaint is often the amount of paperwork required to
process an arrest. Paperwork takes them off the streets where they prefer to be,
therefore they will use their discretion and not arrest in a situation they doubt that a
conviction will result.
115 DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 14, at 199; see also LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN,
POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EXPERIMENTS AND DiLEmMAs 2-3 (1992). Women
have also been accused of using domestic violence arrests as a weapon in divorce
proceedings. Ezra Bowen, Anti-Violence Law Can Be a Weapon in Divorce, NAT'L
L.J., Apr. 11, 1994, at A21. Given the high rate of divorce among police officers, this
accusation adds further fuel to their hostility to mandatory arrest policies.
116 Many times police do not arrest a suspected batterer despite mandatory arrest
laws. See, e.g., BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 73, at 99 (noting that arrests were
made in less than 20% of domestic violence calls in Minneapolis, Minnesota);
Ingrassia & Beck, supra note 45, at 27 (reporting that arrests were made in only 7%
of the cases in New York City).
117 U.S. TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 99, at 105. Thus, other
than seeking shelter with an agency or family member, which is not always feasible,
there is little the battered woman can hope for to obtain immediate protection at or
around the time of a battering episode.
118 As discussed above, many prosecutors are correctly convinced that many
domestic violence complainants will eventually drop charges when the batterer asks to
return and promises to stop the beatings. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
119 "Failure of coordination will cause failure of any individual remedy."
Lerman, supra note 74, at 221-22. Without the coordination of law enforcement and
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Unfortunately, reliance on top-down mandatory policies that try to
reform institutions by command continue today with calls for prosecutorial
"no-drop" policies in domestic violence cases.120 For similar reasons, "no-
drop" policies are also doomed to failure. Like mandatory arrest policies, a
"no-drop" prosecution requirement severely restricts the traditional
discretion of prosecutors. In addition, these policies pass the responsibility
to weed out weak cases to juries, a tactic costly in resources and in public
perceptions of domestic violence.
More generally, since no one has really figured out how to eliminate
police or prosecutor discretion in practice, there is all the more reason to
develop an alternative, or at least a modified approach. 121 For example,
mandatory arrests would be more useful when tailored to meet the problem
of the recidivist batterer. A mandatory arrest policy for violators of civil
protection orders can directly address the immediate needs of victims and
take a harder-line approach toward more persistent batterers. 122 A similarly
narrow "no-drop" policy could be formulated for violators of protection
orders as well at the prosecution level.
With an understanding of the gender role dynamic that affects both
partners in the relationship and the legitimate needs of the institutions that
are asked to intervene, it should be clear that single bullet policies that
mandate more arrests, more prosecutions or higher statutory penalties,
while important components of a broader approach, are doomed as stand-
alone solutions. 123
social and mental health service providers, programs aimed at helping battered women
cannot make a dent in the rate of domestic violence. Id. at 222.
120 See, e.g., Corsilles, supra note 13, at 855.
121 Sherman, supra note 55, at 44.
122 New Jersey's Domestic Violence Act of 1991 modified the state's mandatory
arrest law to broaden its reach and strengthen its impact. Johnson, supra note 23, at
249. A police officer must arrest an accused batterer if "1) a victim exhibits signs of
injury; 2) a warrant is in effect; 3) there is probable cause to believe there is a
violation of a restraining order; [or] 4) there is probable cause to believe a weapon
was involved in the act of domestic violence." Id. Even if none of these factors is
present, however, the officer may still make an arrest if probable cause exists that the
victim was battered. Id. Indeed, when no signs of physical injury are present, the
officer may consider the history of the parties and any other relevant factor in
determining the need for an arrest. Id. at 249-50.
Advocates also support laws that require officers to make a report even if no
arrest is made. Developments, supra note 55, at 1553. This gives the police officer
some discretion but forces him to think carefully about the incident. Mandatory
reports also allow researchers to gather information and increase public awareness. Id.
123 See infra text accompanying notes 140-47, 242-60.
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3. The Current Comprehensive Approach
Other than recognition (or perhaps resignation) that eradication of
domestic violence as a serious health risk for women will be a long
campaign, what guidance can the shortcomings of past efforts afford to
reformers today? Clearly, the first message is that solutions directed at one
institution or practice will have little long-term impact. Single-faceted
policies will not work because they ignore the persistence of batterers, the
dynamic of the battering relationship, and the continued resistance (and
needs) of the social institutions that deal with domestic violence. As the
follow-up mandatory arrest studies suggest, domestic violence cannot be
stopped without a "coordinated response by the law enforcement, social
service, and mental health systems." 124
Therefore, the current thinking is that a comprehensive effort directed
at the police, the courts, and social service agencies offers the greatest
hope for success. 125 These programs are geared at keeping battered women
in the system by addressing their economic and emotional needs, as well as
recognizing that a single violent incident may be insufficient motivation for
a woman to make a committed effort to change. This approach clearly
makes the most sense 126 and appears to be making headway in some
124 Lerman, supra note 74, at 220.
125 See Developments, supra note 55, at 1547-51.
126 Salzman, supra note 25, at 338-53 (describing the successes of Quincy,
Massachusetts which emphasizes a comprehensive approach involving all institutional
players and uses a mix of traditional remedies (i.e., non-criminal) and strict
enforcement for violations through the criminal law. Quincy stresses its equal
emphasis on access for victims and efficient criminal processing of batterers); see also
Developments, supra note 55, at 1516-17; Patricia Nealon, Quincy Program to Aid
Battered Women Wins Grant, BOSTON GLOBE, July 15, 1992, at 27.
Additionally, at the state level, Massachusetts has formed a Domestic Violence
Policy Commission specifically to create "a safety net of social and criminal justice
services and serve as a clearinghouse for the best practices." Gloria Negri,
Commission is Formed to Develop Policies on Domestic Violence, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 20, 1993, at 25. The goals of the commission are to "standardize enforcement,
to empower victims of abuse to transition to violence-free lives, to emphasize
prevention by identifying the appropriate sanctions which will stem the escalation of
violence, and to create broader public awareness." Id.
Another example is Duluth, Minnesota, which has a program that emphasizes
victim support and assailant control. Developments, supra note 55, at 1517-18. Such
efforts use more realistic methods to persuade or force institutional players to be
helpful, not hostile. See id. at 1551-74. For example, some prosecutors have special
domestic violence offices which include counselors and a referral network for
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communities. 127 As part of this effort, some states have created special
domestic violence divisions within the court system and provide special
training for their personnel. By concentrating cases within a discrete unit,
fewer bureaucratic actors are involved, and with training and self-selection,
there is hope that traditional attitudes toward domestic violence can be
transcended. 128 Some of these efforts have also employed a second wave of
creative approaches, such as removing weapons from homes 129 and using
technology to warn victims when their abusers come near. 130
Even within a comprehensive approach, however, specific policy
choices still must be made.131 New laws and policies will have little impact
additional services. Id. at 1554.
127 The San Diego approach is considered one of the nation's most effective. It
focuses on special training for police, prosecutors, judges, and medical personnel who
deliver standardized remedies to domestic violence. Kathleen McClain, Charlotte
Leaders Hear How San Diego Fights Domestic Violence, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Oct.
22, 1993, at 1C.
128 Some advocates worry that creating a special criminal court for domestic
violence will trivialize it. For example, in Illinois, Cook County created two domestic
violence courtrooms in 1986. These courts handled only misdemeanors, thus all
domestic violence cases were filed as misdemeanors, regardless of the seriousness of
the assault. Separating domestic violence courts from other courts risks perpetuating
the stereotype that domestic violence is a less serious crime. Burleigh, supra note 26,
at 3. On the other hand, limiting the number of courts reduces the amount of re-
training necessary. Florida seems to be experiencing mixed results with its new
domestic violence courts. See, e.g., Jenson, supra note 78, at 1B (reporting research
showing that while there is a decrease in physical abuse from batterers who have been
through the system, there is frequently an increase in psychological or mental abuse).
129 The 1991 Domestic Violence Act in New Jersey allows police officers to seize
any weapons which they reasonably believe might be used against the victim. Johnson,
supra note 23, at 250.
130 One of the chief criticisms of civil protection orders is that once an order is
granted, the woman feels safe, but when the batterer returns, the order is a mere piece
of paper. In addition, police often arrive too late on the scene to capture the batterer.
One solution to this problem is the electronic monitoring of subjects under restraining
orders. Electronic monitoring devices can be set so that they will notify the victim and
the police when a batterer comes closer than the order allows. Sheriff Robert Rufo of
Suffolk County, Massachusetts, said that these devices "empower the victim because
the minute a stalker comes within proximity, he will be known to her and the police."
Cheong Chow, Abused Women Gain a Weapon; High-Tech Warning System Now on
the Market, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 5, 1992, at 13. Furthermore, the device can be used
to document every instance in which an order has been violated. Id. The wearing of
such a device also clearly stigmatizes the batterer and prevents him from being
perceived otherwise by co-workers, family and friends.
131 See Developments, supra note 55, at 52 (advocating that "criminal
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unless they are accompanied by changes in the basic belief systems of
abusive men, battered women, police officers, prosecutors, judges, social
workers, and society in general. Thus, the task of reformers is not as
simplistic as changing laws and policies in order to increase the likelihood
and severity of punishment for abusive behavior; rather, they must also
transform the way domestic violence is perceived by society.
Part III addresses the relationship between legal reforms and social
change in the context of domestic violence. It cautions, however, that
legislative solutions must be realistic in their transformative goals. While
reforms surely must attempt to change entrenched cultural and institutional
values, at the same time they must use or adapt aspects of existing concepts
and institutional practices to avoid being rejected out of hand or silently
subverted by bureaucratic actors.
III. CONTEMPT AND EMYPOWERMENT: AN
ANSWER TO MARTHA MINOW
A. Words As the "Door to Change" and the Trap of "Victim Talk"
In two articles, Professor Martha Minow has addressed the question of
whether legal reforms can truly change the family violence dynamic of our
society. In "Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Language and
Family Violence," 132 she frames the question as whether "words can stem
violence," particularly words used by lawyers. She criticizes the language
used in legal texts to describe family violence, 133 and compares it with
prosecutions should receive the greatest emphasis of all substantive approaches to
domestic violence").
132 Mionw, supra note 8; see also Martha Minow, The Case of Legal Language,
in THE STATE OF THE LANGUAGE (L. Michaels & C. Ricks eds., 1990); Martha Minow
& Deborah Rhode, Questioning the Questions, Reform the Reformers: A Feminist
Perspective in Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS (Sugerman
& Haye eds., 1990); NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT
M. COVER (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992); Martha Minow, "Forming Underneath
Everything that Grows":. Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 819;
Martha Minow, The Free Exercise of Families, 1991 ILL. L. REV. 925; Martha
Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In & Who's Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269
(1991).
133 Minow focused on DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs.,
489 U.S. 189 (1989). Three-year-old Joshua DeShaney was beaten by his father so
badly that he became paralyzed and lost the function of one-half of his brain. The
majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, used legal rhetoric and
unemotional language that blunted the impact of the trauma that Joshua received at the
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more evocative descriptions of family violence from literature and
music. 134 She argues that words matter because
[i]n order to change policy and to enforce adapted policies, many words
first must be marshalled to convince people of the degree of domestic
violence and the need for change. Words play a significant role in
changing the external and internal restraints people may feel against
committing violence against family members. 135
Minow asks whether there are words to describe "family violence that
do not make it seem routine and familiar." 136 While there are important
extra-legal efforts underway to combat domestic violence, 137 a significant
percentage of reform has been targeted at legal solutions.1 38 Therefore,
hands of his father. The Court then employed words like "private" and "failure to act"
to deny Joshua recovery on his lawsuit against the county. Minow, supra note 8, at
1668. Professor Minow described the Court's choice of passionless language as "a
choice to submerge sympathy under fear, a choice to seek and then to cling to totemic
concepts-acts omissions, public and private-to avoid confronting our mutual
implication in one another's lives." Id. at 1675.
134 Minow argues that the use by legal scholars of more evocative language like
that found in literature "may help illuminate the difficulties in speaking about domestic
violence" and may help persuade judges and others to do something about it. Minow,
supra note 8, at 1688-89. She uses literature and music to teach judges how to enlarge
their understandings and sympathies of the problems of domestic abuse and how to
look at life from the perspective of others. Id. at 1694-99.
135 Id. at 1665 n.2.
136 Id. at 1665. The silence surrounding domestic violence is so strong that even
professionals whose jobs put them in touch with it find themselves without a
vocabulary to break through to their clients. A doctor described her experience of
asking women if domestic violence was an issue in their lives: "It seemed so out of the
blue. . .. I had to find words that didn't make it seem so odd to people." Stripling,
supra note 21, at 7. Other doctors have described similar discomfort. Id.
137 There are over 1200 shelters for abused women operated nationwide. They
offer women temporary lodging and child care, and arrange for transportation,
medical care, and legal and social counseling. They also help women readjust to their
situation after they leave. Some shelters even offer counseling for batterers. Cris
Barrish, Shelters: Safe Houses for Abused, NEWS-JOURNAL (Wilmington, Del.), Feb.
4, 1990, at A10. However, even these efforts sometimes require legal intervention of
some sort, such as putting women in touch with authorities to file charges and keeping
locations of shelters secret. Id. Many shelters are forced to turn away two-thirds of
women seeking help due to lack of funds, so these women must still look to legal
remedies. Id.
138 Some internal reforms were in response to class action lawsuits brought
against police departments. DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 14, at 165-66. Self-reform
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Minow places specific emphasis on whether there are different words
lawyers can use "to persuade judges, to empower victims," 139 since a
significant part of society's response to domestic violence is "how the law
should respond to individual acts of domestic violence in order to best
protect victims and punish batterers." 140 Thus a particular problem for the
law, and particularly for criminal law, is to find appropriate language to
account for and adjust to the social dynamic underlying individual acts of
domestic violence. 141
However, Minow does not focus solely on the language used by
lawyers. She also asks whether there are words uttered by anyone else that
can help to stop the violence.142 In the domestic violence arena, the group
most in need of new words, or in some cases any words at all, are battered
women themselves. Without having words to condemn what has been done
to them, without knowing words to ask for help from friends and society,
without words to tell the batterers that their behavior is unacceptable, there
proved insufficient, prompting most states to enact tougher laws. See Johnson, supra
note 23, at 236 (describing how New Jersey's original Prevention of Domestic
Violence Act of 1981 was ineffective, resulting in the new act in 1991).
139 Minow, supra note 8, at 1666.
140 Developments, supra note 55, at 1503.
141 As lawyers, of course, we must guard against a bias for legal solutions. And,
if lawyers participate in a broad-based attack on domestic violence, we necessarily will
have to work more closely with battered women advocates and social service agencies.
In such cases, we must also be prepared for conflicting ideological approaches and
suspicion from those quarters.
I experienced this first hand in 1993 when I was invited as a last minute speaker
at a St. Petersburg, Florida workshop to teach battered women advocates to be expert
witnesses. My role was to act as a prosecutor and cross-examine a nationally regarded
expert on battered women. In the organizational meeting the night before the
conference, all the lawyers recruited to participate met with this expert. When she
informed us that she had been cross-examined by prosecutors in numerous trials and
that there were standard techniques they used, I asked her to share these stories with
me in order to improve our overall presentation. She refused to do so, citing her fear
of me as a former prosecutor and her uncertainty about who might attend the
conference and later share this information in such a way as to hurt the movement.
She then had a similar conflict with the public defender present, which suggested a
clash of cultures, between lawyers who believe in truth through the adversary system
and a member of a movement for whom the safety of its members is preeminent. The
program went reasonably well without her divulging her secrets and we all parted on
good terms. The lasting import of this event, however, was the recognition of how
differently individuals even on the "same side" of this issue perceive their roles.
142 Minow, supra note 8, at 1666.
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is little that can be done from the outside.143
Yet Professor Minow recognizes that for battered women, and for
victims in general, our society's conceptualization of victimization is often
as paralyzing as having no words at all. 44 She discusses this dilemma in
Surviving Victim Talk, stating that victim talk
creates a self-fulfilling prophesy, on the one hand, by suggesting that
victims are powerless. Yet on the other hand, rejecting victim talk may
lead to blaming powerless people for their own powerlessness. It may also
lead to a sense of futility and political passivity for just those people [The
battered woman or victim] must then struggle to reconcile a positive self-
image with the image of oneself as a powerless and defeated victim. 145
We must therefore offer battered women something more than the label
of victims in need of our succor. "Victim talk," Professor Minow points
out, "obscures the complex interactions of individual choice, social
structures, and the historical legacies within which both individuals and
143 One leader at a health clinic spoke out against mandatory reporting of
domestic violence incidents by physicians, stating that some women may not seek help
if they fear it will be reported.
Part of what we're trying to do is to empower the person to let them actually take
the action to make the decisions.. . . We can help them if there are legal issues
just by documenting in our medical records what's going on. If they choose to
press charges, that's their decision, but I've had women who would only talk to
me if I did not have to report them.
Stripling, supra note 21, at 7 (quoting Dr. Barbara Meyer, a leader of the Domestic
Violence Prevention Project at Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound,
Washington).
144 Early battered women advocates stressed the victimization of women to
change society's attitude that if women did not want the abuse they would leave.
Victim concepts such as "learned helplessness" explained this phenomenon. WALKER,
supra note 13, at 187. Perhaps such an emphasis has entrenched the battered women
movement too deeply in victimology.
The over-reliance on images of victimization have also led to calls for
eliminating, or at least substantially modifying, the battered woman syndrome defense
for women who kill their batterers. Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L.
REV. 1 (1994) (arguing that the battered woman syndrome currently is profoundly
anti-feminist because it reinforces a view of women who stay in abusive relationships
as deviant and devoid of the free will and personal responsibility that male criminal
defendants are assumed to possess).
145 Minow, supra note 9, at 1420-21.
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institutions operate." 146 Public debate and legal solutions that talk about
domestic violence only in terms of victimology "neglect the complex
solutions needed to sustain and equip victimized individuals to choose
differently while also restricting the individuals and social forces that
oppress them." 147
B. Empowerment Ideology, Not Victimology in Domestic Violence
Reform
The Minow articles suggest a series of interrelated practical questions
about the need for new language and policy. First, what words can legal
reformers offer to battered women to help them change? Second, will these
words allow battered women to acknowledge their victimhood without
hamstringing them with their own powerlessness or imposing a
paternalistic solution from above? Third, what words do we ourselves use
146 Id. at 1429-30. See also CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:
PSYCHOLOGIcAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982). Gilligan's research
reveals that men and women present "different modes of thinking" about relationships.
Men tend to value autonomy and see others as opponents in a contest of rights,
whereas women tend to value caring and see others as members of a network of
relationships on whose continuation they all depend. Id. at 59. Coughlin, supra note
144, suggests that aceording to this theory, a woman who stays in an abusive
relationship rather than being faulted for not leaving, should be "applauded for her
endurance, her perseverance, and self-sacrifice in order to nurture her violently
explosive spouse and repair, if possible, their pathological interactions." Id. at 89.
147 Minow, supra note 9, at 1430. Another reason to transcend "victim talk" is
that victims often lack the social vision to clearly see their problem or a way out.
Many battered women will initially deny at great lengths that they are battered
women. Others will take the blame for the battering.
Feminist scholars, in particular, have emphasized yet another reason to be
suspicious of a normative scheme that relies wholly on preference satisfaction,
beyond recognizing the problems of ambivalence and the need to look carefully at
the social context in which preferences are formed. Relatively disempowered
people, as women frequently are in relationship to men, may be unable to form
truly self-promoting preferences. The most ready, and dramatic examples, are of
women in long-term battering relationships. Their ostensible "desires" may
simply be to do whatever will accommodate the batterer's wishes, hoping, often
vainly, that if they are able to anticipate each conceivable whim, that they can
avoid being victimized.
Mark Kelman, A Critique of Conservative Legal Thought, in THE POLrIcs OF LAW: A
PRoGREsswE CarriQuE 444 (David Kairys ed. 1990) (endnote omitted).
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in our roles as advocate, prosecutor, and judge in order to enable this
process to occur in domestic violence reform? Finally, if we can identify
such words, what are their implications for legal solutions?
The women's movement, and other victims' movements seeking to
escape the throes of "victim talk," have already identified a central
word/concept for liberation-empowerment.148 Literature from the battered
women's movement consistently employs this theme because empowerment
ideology offers the battered woman language to take control of her life and
to take the initiative to seek assistance from organizations, friends, and
family. Empowerment translated into social action takes the form of
shelters and economic independence programs to provide the practical
means to break the economic and psychological binds to the batterer.149
148 See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32-45 (1987)
(Rather than focus on whether men and women are "different," MacKinnon argues
that the focus of feminist analysis should be on the power differential between the
genders in current society. Therefore, the empowerment of women is a central
component of her dominance theory of feminism.); National Coalition Against
Domestic Violence, A Current Analysis of the Battered Women's Movement (January
1992) at 5. This advocacy booklet states the following:
One key prerequisite to the ending of violence is the empowerment of all women
and children. Women and children must be able to direct our own lives, and
control our own bodies. . . . Empowerment can only be achieved through
collective action, and an understanding that battering is a societal and political
problem as well as a personal and family problem.
In addition to the legal and economic constraints inhibiting their ability to leave or
obtain help to leave the relationship, battered women are often also unable to take
advantage of what help is available due to fear and incapacitation. Therefore, for those
working with battered women as lawyers or advocates, the goal is not just to provide
legal services, shelter, or counseling. The goal is to empower them and help "them
realize that domestic violence should not be tolerated and that ending a relationship is
an option. . . ." Angelo N. Ancheta, Community Lawyering, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1363,
1387 (1993) (book review).
149 One empowering view of battering is to see that women are not beaten
just from subordination but also from contesting it. Had women consistently
accepted their subordinate status, and had men never felt their superior status
challenged, there might have been less marital violence. To focus on women's
"provocations," and to examine men's grievances against their wives, is not to
blame women but, often, to praise them. It is to uncover the evidence of women's
resistance.
GORDON, supra note 13, at 286.
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But empowerment language has its limitations, both in general and in
this setting. 150 Generally, empowerment ideology can lead to divisiveness
and separatism, 151 in which the victimized group rejects outside assistance
as paternalistic and tainted by past actions or dominant cultural attitudes. 152
This is particularly true when institutions needed to effectuate specific
reforms (e.g., the justice system and its component parts) have been part of
the problem in the past.
More importantly, empowering battered women addresses only one-
half of the domestic violence equation. Words must still be found to
challenge and constrain the batterer's actions.
Finding words that lawyers can use that both transform our
institutions' approach to domestic violence and empower battered women is
therefore more difficult than saying "empowerment" and moving on. 153
150 A wonderful word, "empowerment speak" can obscure the very difficult
social interaction between a professional, who clearly sees that the relationship is
unhealthy and in fact dangerous for a woman, but nevertheless finds the appropriate
language to encourage, support, confront, or demand that a woman change her
behavior.
151 For example, "[riadical feminists tended to favor separatism and emphasized
the need to develop a women's culture, rather than building coalitions with men as
liberal and socialist women did." MARY BECKER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 19 (1994); see also MARILYN
FRYE, THE POLITICS OF REALITY: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 104 (1983); SARAH L.
HOAGLAND, LESBIAN ETHICS: TOWARD A NEW VALUE 57-58 (1988).
152 Battered women empowerment ideology can be problematic for women who
are members of a racial or ethnic minority. Black women may share the view of a
sexual assault coordinator in Oakland, California, who stated, "I am black first. My
culture and anything else comes after.... Our husbands and boyfriends may be
perpetrators, but we are also concerned about what will happen to them in the racist
[justice] system." World's Women Speak As One Against Abuse, L.A. TIMES, May 27,
1991, at El; see Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino Males:
An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 231 (1994) (Latina women need special support services due to cultural
disadvantages); Elizabeth Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of
Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 520, 535
(1992) (battered immigrant women may not be able to call police if they fear
deportation).
Similarly, some African-Americans are rethinking their allegiance to Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and its integrative ideal. Instead, they are
experimenting with separatist educational institutions, once derided as a throw-back to
the discredited "separate, but equal" doctrine. See Drew S. Days, III, Brown Blues:
Rethinking the Integrative Ideal, 34 WM. & MARY L. REv. 53 (1992).
153 See infra text accompanying notes 239-43 for a discussion of the
disagreement between feminists and others over the role of criminalization of
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Nevertheless, there have been some successes. For example, as previously
noted, the dominant question generally asked about battered women is:
"Why do they stay?" However, the actual data suggests that the most
serious violence (including more than half the murders of battered women
by their partners) occurs after the woman has left the home or after
repeated efforts to leave.154 Newspapers are full of stories of domestic
murders committed precisely because the victim was attempting to leave
the relationship or avail herself of a legal remedy such as a protection
order. 155 Feminist scholars recognizing the phenomenon that serious
domestic violence is frequently the result of leaving, not the failure to
leave, have urged a new label-separation assault. 156
This is more than a mere cogent naming of sociological data. The term
"separation assault" explodes the myth that battered women are passive
creatures who share the blame for their plight because they knowingly elect
to remain in the path of violence. By removing blame and telling them that
they are entitled to society's help in exercising their right to live where and
with whom they want, it also empowers women.
As a legal matter, prosecutorial policy and judicial sentencing of those
who commit "separation assault" can be seen as comparable to stranger-on-
protection order violations.
154 Separation assaults also indicate that a large problem in domestic violence is
not that "women won't leave," but rather the real dangers of doing so. Martha
Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Woman: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90
MICH. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1991); see also ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN
KILL 114 (1987).
155 Parnas, supra note 12, at 153 (noting that the FBI reported in 1986 that
husbands or boyfriends were responsible for 30% of female homicides); see also,
Larry Dougherty, Victims of Abuse Should Choose Flight over Fight, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Mar. 7, 1994, at 1B (reporting stories of two women who were shot to death
by former boyfriends after histories of abuse); Bill Sanderson, Judge Ignored Violence
Policy Husband Sent Home: Wife Killed, THE RECORD, Aug. 8, 1991, at Al (wife
clubbed to death with a baseball bat after judge ignored guideline to remove the
batterer from the home, and prohibited him only from entering her bedroom); Woman
Was Denied Protection Before Death, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 2, 1987, at B12 (woman
killed by former boyfriend after police prevented her from filing assault complaints
against him).
156 The separation assault concept may also explain some anomalies in the arrest
studies which indicate that many couples were not living together anymore after
arrest. Rather than conclude that the arrest was the trigger for the separation, perhaps
it was the decision to separate that caused the assault. See Frisch, supra note 110, at
209. It is suggested that perhaps arrest is ineffective in stopping the "expected
progression of violence ... rather than to fault the arrest for the subsequent
violence." Id. at 214.
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stranger assault and not diminished as merely "family violence." 157
C. Let's Hold Batterers in Contempt
While "separation assault" does to some extent focus blame on the
batterer who is unwilling to give up the relationship, it still primarily
addresses the battered woman, and more specifically only those who try to
leave. Other than attempting to label every aspect of domestic strife as
"criminal," 158 theorists have been less successful finding words for the
batterer's actions.
In this vein, this Article suggests a word for the batterer's side of the
equation-contempt. I mean contempt in two senses, one designed for the
legal system and another for society in general. As a familiar legal word
contempt means "a sanction for failure to obey a court order." 159 In more
common usage, however, contempt is defined as "the act of despising." 160
When both the legal system and society hold batterers in contempt, surely
we have found transformative language to better express how we feel about
men who physically and emotionally harm the women they profess to
love. 161 Furthermore, when batterers are held in contempt by all strata of
157 But see Mahoney, supra note 154, who warns that an overemphasis on
separation assault risks protecting only those women who separated or tried to separate
before being assaulted. The woman who still lives with the batterer but asserts an
intent to separate also needs protection from an attack that is caused by her assertion.
Id. at 65.
158 See infra text accompanying notes 239-69 for a discussion of criminalization.
159 Contempt is a willful disobedience of the court's authority. Contempt can be
classified as either civil or criminal. Civil contempt results when a party fails to do
something for the benefit of another party, but the offense is not directly against the
dignity of the court. Criminal contempt, however, entails a direct offense upon the
court, such as disobedience of a lawful order resulting in the obstruction of the
administration ofjustice. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 318 (6th ed. 1991).
16 0 WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 180 (1965); see also,
THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 438 (2d ed. 1987)
(defining contempt as "the feeling with which a person regards anything considered
mean, vile, or worthless").
161 Like "separation assault," this renaming runs the risk of marginalizing those
battered women who fall outside its definition, either by failing to try to leave, or
here, by not having a protection order at the time of the battery. See supra notes 32-
55 and accompanying text. While this is certainly a risk, the potential remains that as
society begins to view batterers contemptuously, more battered women will be
empowered to obtain a protection order earlier in the relationship. Eventually,
perhaps, marriage contracts themselves could be required to contain binding language
that the parties agree not to batter each other within the relationship and that such
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society; when it is a label to be avoided like child molester, perhaps then
the violence will stop. 162
How can the concept of "contempt" be integrated into the legal
response to domestic violence? I believe that one path to this goal can be to
make criminal contempt the preferred, initial sanction for a violation of a
protection order. The use of criminal contempt sanctions for this purpose
should have multiple positive consequences both for the legal system and
on societal attitudes.
First, as noted, contempt language has an everyday meaning that we
apply to individuals whose conduct we find despicable. This concept
meshes well with current societal values about bullies-those who use
physical force against a substantially smaller person, or a victim who is
unwilling to fight. 163 Using language that focuses on the bullying,
"contemptible" quality of domestic violence thus shifts the focus away
from the victim and rightfully onto the offender. 164
This shift also transfers into the courtroom. Rather than dwelling on
the history of the relationship (such as the woman's decision to stay), a
criminal contempt proceeding is primarily about the batterer and the judge.
language could be interpreted as having the same legal effect of a court order, making
contempt an immediately available sanction.
162 Others have suggested additional renamings of domestic violence. Charlotte
Bunch, director of the Center for Global Issues and Women's Leadership at Rutgers
University, argues that gender violence should be counted as a human rights abuse,
claiming it is "the most pervasive and insidious human rights abuse in the world
today." Hendrix, supra note 152. Legally, such a recognition would increase the
remedies available, particularly for women seeking political asylum who are fleeing
forced marriages, abuse or incest. At home, she advocates reclassifying domestic
violence as a hate crime. Id.; see also, Nancie L. Katz, Domestic Violence: A Civil
Rights Crime? Massachusetts Court Extending Protection, CHI. TRiB., Apr. 16, 1994,
at 1 (describing as a "path-breaking development" a Massachusetts case in which the
court held that a repeat abuser would face civil rights charges if he assaulted any
women). Congress has established "a Federal civil rights cause of action for victims of
crimes of violence motivated by gender." in the Violence Against Women Act. Pub.
L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1916 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994)).
163 The average height and weight differential between men and women is not
present in every relationship and obviously weapons are a great equalizer. Therefore,
it is important to again recognize a significant reason there are so many more male
batterers is the gender role difference in the willingness to resort to violence to solve
interpersonal problems. Walker, supra note 13, at 15.
164 See Waits, supra note 35, at 288 ("He is violent at home because he has a
bully's 'sure winner' mentality. He beats his wife because he can win a physical battle
with her, and because he can get away with it, so long as society does not
intervene.").
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The court's narrow interest is in whether the contemnor did something that
violated the court's outstanding order. 165 This places the batterer on the
defensive. Because of the existence of the order, and the often
accompanying lecture of the issuing court to avoid situations that could
lead to violations, it is harder for the batterer to claim that the woman
provoked him or instigated the confrontation.
Furthermore, purely within legal culture, contempt language is quite
powerful. 166 The extreme deference paid to the court by attorneys is
ultimately backed by the contempt power. 167 Moreover, potentially any
defiance or evasion of a court order can result in this sanction. 168 The
potency of legal contempt language is transmitted to clients through their
lawyers. Attorneys carefully coach their clients how to behave in front of
the judge and instruct them to comply with all court orders to the letter.
Contempt sanctions also occupy a distinct status in a civil case because it is
the only way a civil litigant can be incarcerated. While rarely resulting in
this ultimate sanction, nevertheless, contempt motions are filed in a wide
variety of civil proceedings based on in-court behavior, for discovery
violations and for violations of injunctions. Most importantly, contempt
sanctions are applicable to civil protection order violations, either by
statute or under the inherent power of a court to vindicate its orders.
Employing contempt sanctions to punish protection order violations
takes advantage of compatible common and legal language and an existing
165 A Denver family court judge described her view of violations of protection
orders as follows, 'to call a restraining order just a piece of paper is to demean the
authority of the court. . . ." Gail D. Cox, The Court of St. Joan: An Innovative
Protective Order Court in Denver Hears Pleas from People Who Can't Wait for
Routine Justice, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 9, 1992, at 1 (attributing to Judge Jacqueline St.
loan).
166 See Edward G. Mascolo, Procedures and Incarceration for Civil Contempt: A
Clash of Wills Between Judge and Contemnor, 16 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 171 (1990) (tracing the historical roots of the contempt power and
contempt's crucial past and present function in ensuring the ability of courts to
administer justice).
167 See Teresa Hanger, Note, The Modern Status of the Rules Permitting a Judge
to Punish Direct Contempt Summarily, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 553 (1987)
(discussing rationales for permitting courts the power to punish in-court contempt in
summary fashion).
168 Sometimes this fear is ameliorated by humor. Among my former colleagues at
the U.S. Attorney's Office, a lawyer heading to court bearing news that the office
would not comply with a judge's request was told to bring a toothbrush in the event he
or she was "stepped back" to the holding cell after a finding of contempt.
Nevertheless, in four years of practice, I knew of only one federal public defender
who was held in contempt for outrageous courtroom behavior.
1995] 1189
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
institutional concept and practice that is powerful and widespread within
the legal system. The criminal contempt sanction strategy also
simultaneously reconceptualizes social attitudes toward domestic batterers
while providing a needed remedy for violations of protection orders.
Therefore, the use of criminal contempt sanctions to enforce domestic
protection orders presents a unique opportunity to integrate language and
policy to transform a critical area of domestic violence reform.
Criminal contempt sanctions for protection orders can also fill a critical
gap in society's response to domestic violence in which the criminal law
has been unable alone to provide an effective remedy. Part IV explores this
idea in more depth, with particular attention being paid to the potential for
the criminal contempt route to empower battered women and the practical
advantages of this remedy as an initial response to a violation of protection
orders.
IV. CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS AND CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
SANCTIONS
A. Civil Protection Orders Are a Core Component of Society's
Response to Domestic Violence
1. An Overview of Civil Protection Orders
Civil protection orders are now available for battered women in all
fifty states and the District of Columbia. 169 They permit a victim of
169 See ALA. CODE § 30-5-7 (1989); ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.010 (1991); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602 (1989 & Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-201
(Michie 1993); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6300 (West 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-
4-102 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15 (West 1986 &
Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 949 (Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
1003 (1989 & Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30 (West Supp. 1995); GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-13-4 (1991 & Supp. 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-3 (1993); IDAHO CODE
§ 39-6304 (1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 60/214 (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp.
1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-5.1-2 (West Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.4
(West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107 (1967 & Supp. 1993); KY. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 403.740 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984 & Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
46:2136 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 766 (West 1981
& Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506 (1991 & Supp. 1994); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 3 (Law. Co-op. 1994); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950
(West 1986); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 51813.01 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 93-21-7 (1973 & Supp 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.035 (Vernon 1986 &
1190 [Vol. 56:1153
EMPOWERING THE BA7TERED WOMAN
domestic violence to obtain a binding order from a court that at the
minimum prohibits an abuser from committing further acts of violence. 170
Such orders may also enjoin other conduct (e.g., all contact whatsoever
with the woman), award custody of children to the woman, limit the
batterer's visitation rights, grant the woman possession of the residence or
other property, and award child support or other economic relief.17'
Obtaining a civil protection order is usually a two-step process. 172
First, the victim petitions the court ex parte for a temporary order that
provides emergency injunctive relief restraining the batterer from inflicting
further violence. 173 The emergency order will remain in effect for a short
duration, usually only a few weeks. 174 The emergency order must then be
served on the batterer along with notice of an adversary hearing. 175
Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-121 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924 (1988
& Supp. 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.020 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 173-B:4 (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-4 (Michie 1994); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 842 (McKinney
1983 & Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-3 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-
02 (1991 & Supp. 1993); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.31 (Anderson 1989 & Supp.
1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.4 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 107.718 (1990 & Supp. 1994); 23 PA. CONS. STAT ANN. § 6108 (1991); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 15-15-4 (1988 & Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-4-60 (Law. Co-op.
1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-5 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605
(1991); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.11 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-6-2 (1989 & Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1104 (1989 & Supp. 1994);
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.1 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10.99.040 (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6 (1992 & Supp.
1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 813.12 (West Supp. 1992); Wyo. STAT. § 35-21-104
(1994). Use of these orders to protect battered women is growing within jurisdictions.
Parnas, supra note 12, at 124; Finn, supra note 92, at 43.
170 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-6 (1992 & Supp. 1994) (providing that a
protection order "shall direct the respondent to refrain from abusing the petitioner").
171 Most states provide for this and similar type of relief in their statutes. See,
e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-5-7 (1989) (describing the options available to the court to
fashion appropriate relief). For a list of statutes authorizing protection orders, see
supra note 135.
172 While the specific requirements for obtaining a protection order vary
somewhat from state to state, the basic procedures are similar. See Kinports &
Fischer, supra note 81, at 165-66.
173 See, e.g., ALASKASTAT. § 25.35.020 (1991).
174 See id. § 25.35.020(c) (providing that the emergency order will remain in
effect for 20 days).
175 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-206(e) (Michie 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46b-15(e) (West Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 Subd. 7(b) (West
1990 & Supp. 1995); see also Kinports & Fischer, supra note 81, at 165-66. For a
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Second, the court will hold a subsequent hearing during which the civil
protection order may be made semi-permanent, lasting anywhere from
several weeks 176 to a year or longer.177
Civil protection orders, as opposed to criminal sanctions, are
prospective. They explicitly seek to alter the future behavior of the
batterer. The remedies offered by protection orders are also broader than
criminal remedies because they are available to deal with conduct that the
police might otherwise overlook as not serious. 178 In addition to providing
a measure of protection, a civil protection order serves to bring the batterer
and victim into the domestic violence system. 179
While civil protection orders were initially limited to certain classes of
persons and were sometimes difficult to obtain, 180 their availability and
discussion of ex parte and full (or permanent) protection orders, see supra note 92.
176 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 39-6306(1) (1993) (fixing the duration for a final
protective order at three months); LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 46:2136D (West 1982 &
Supp. 1995) (same).
177 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 60/220(b) (Smith-Hurd 1993 &
Supp. 1994) (fixing the duration of a protection order at two years); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 173-B:411I (1994) (fixing the duration of a final protection order at one year,
but providing for extensions if necessary).
178 Developments, supra note 55, at 1514; Elizabeth Topliffe, Why Civil
Protection Orders Are Effective Remedies for Domestic Violence But Mutual Protective
Orders Are Not, 67 IND. L.i. 1039, 1047-48 (1992). For example, courts have
imposed punishment on defendants for violating protection orders for following a
petitioner, People v. Whitfield, 498 N.E.2d 262 (Ill. Ct. App. 1986); having unwanted
flowers and pizza delivered to the petitioner's home, Saliterman v. State, 443 N.W.2d
841 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); sliding a letter under the petitioner's door, State ex rel.
Delisser v. Hardy, 749 P.2d 1207 (Or. Ct. App. 1988); and making unwanted
telephone calls, People v. Brockelman, 862 P.2d 1040 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993); State ex
rel. Emery v. Andisha, 805 P.2d 718 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
179 Developments, supra note 55, at 1514; Caitlin E. Borgmann, Note, Battered
Women's Substantive Due Process Claims: Can Orders of Protection Deflect
DeShaney?, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 1280, 1323 (1990).
180 Initial problems that battered women encountered with civil protection orders
related to their accessibility. The forms that had to be filled out to start the process
moving were numerous and difficult to complete without assistance. Kinports &
Fischer, supra note 81, at 171-75. Moreover, many women found it difficult to get to
the courthouse during business hours. Id. at 178. Slow service also created problems
for battered women, the most obvious problem being the vulnerability that women
were exposed to by not having the protection of the order between filing and serving.
Id. at 222-23.
In years past, some states refused to provide protection to a woman unless she and
the batterer were married, making it difficult to obtain protection against former
spouses. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for
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flexibility1 81 has grown dramatically in recent years. 182 There is now near
universal agreement that civil protection orders are an essential part of
Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv.
801, 815 (1993). But most states now do not require that the batterer and victim live
together. Id.
Courts are also sometimes reluctant to extend the protection of domestic violence
statutes. See, e.g., Woodin v. Rasmussen, 455 N.W.2d 535 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)
(refusing to extend protection under MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01, subd. 2(b) because
an unborn child was not a "child in common" as required under the statute); Croswell
v. Shenouda, 646 A.2d 1140 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994) (holding that a prior
terminated pregnancy does not qualify as "child in common" under N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:25-19d).
181 In fact, an acknowledged advantage of civil protection orders is the range of
remedies available to the court. Topliffe, supra note 178, at 1064.
182 Issuance of civil protection orders are at record levels. For example, in
Massachusetts by September 1992, 45,000 orders had already been issued. Adrian
Walker, Restraining Orders Are at Record High, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 23, 1992, at 1.
However, some statutes authorizing the issuance of protection orders still lack key
critical remedies such as requiring the courts to award exclusive possession of the
residence to the woman and authorizing the courts to issue orders based solely on
verbal threats. See Kinports & Fischer, supra note 81, at 195-96, 200-01.
Moreover, while most courts now routinely grant an initial protection order, there
are still some jurisdictions in which courts have frustrated the enforcement of the
statutes by delaying grants of the initial emergency order, or denying such an order
altogether. Judges have great discretion regarding the issuance of protection orders
and many will not issue one absent proof of serious acts of violence. BUZAWA &
BuZAWA, supra note 73, at 115-17. A protective order is a significant restriction on
an individual's liberty and judges are naturally circumspect of violating an individual's
due process rights, particularly when issuing ex parte orders. Id. Ex parte
prejudgment orders have been challenged on procedural due process grounds in the
past, most notably in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), and courts remain
cognizant of this when issuing them. See Nadine Taub, Ex Parte Proceedings in
Domestic Violence Situations: Alternative Frameworks for Constitutional Scrutiny, 9
HOFSTRA L. REV. 95, 99-103 (1980). Indeed, most statutes require that ex parte
orders be issued only upon a showing of something similar to "[c]lear and convincing
evidence of immediate and present danger of abuse." W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-5 (1992
& Supp. 1994). Furthermore, some courts will decline to issue a protection order if
the woman delayed seeking it or previously dropped it. Kinports & Fischer, supra
note 81, at 189-95.
Another serious problem women face when deciding whether or not to obtain a
protection order is how the man will react. One study indicates that 10% of women
are beaten simply because they obtained a protection order. Kathleen J. Ferraro,
Cops, Courts, and Woman Battering, in VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: THE BLOODY
FOOTPRINTS 173 (Pauline B. Bart & Eileen G. Moran eds., 1993).
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domestic violence reform.183 But while everyone agrees that greater
enforcement of civil protection orders is necessary, lack of enforcement is
still cited as the principal weakness of protection orders. 184
2. Civil Protection Orders Are Currently Enforced Through Contempt
Sanctions and Criminal Prosecution
Varying state to state, a violation of a civil protection order is
punishable as a misdemeanor, by civil or criminal contempt, or by both
criminal and contempt sanctions. Approximately forty states currently have
statutes criminalizing violations of protection orders.18 5 Just over thirty-
183 DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 14, at 167.
184 Developments, supra note 55, at 1511, 1521. The unwavering enforcement of
protection orders, as well as serious sanctions imposed on violators, are necessary to
reduce recidivism and prevent escalation of the violence; David A. Ford & Mary 1.
Regoli, The Criminal Prosecution of Wife Assaulters: Process, Problems, and Effects,
in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE ASSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATION 140 (N.
Zoe Hilton ed., 1993) [hereinafter LEGAL RESPONSES].
185 ALA. CODE § 30-5A-3 (Supp. 1993); ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.740(b) (Supp.
1993); AIZ. REV. STAT. AN. § 13-2810B (1989 & Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 9-15-207(b) (Michie 1993); CAL. PEN. CODE § 273.6(a) (West Supp. 1995); COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-803.5(2)(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-107(b) (West Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 950(e) (Supp.
1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.31 (West Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-6(b)
(1991); HAw. REV. STAT. § 586-11 (1993 & Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE § 39-6312(1)
(1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 60/221(c) (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1994);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3107(g) (Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.763(2)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984 & Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 769
(West 1981 & Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-509(a) (Supp. 1994);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 7 (Law. Co-op. 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01
Subd. 14(a) (West 1990 & Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.085(8) (Vernon Supp.
1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-626(1) (Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-
924(3) (Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.100 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1993);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:81 (Supp. 1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-6(E)
(Michie 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-4 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-06
(1991 & Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.27 (Anderson 1993); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.6A (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-15-3(3)
(1988 & Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-25-50 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-10-13 (1992); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.16 (Supp.
1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6(5) (1989 & Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
1030 (Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-253.2 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1994);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.110(1) (West Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-
10d (Supp. 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. §813.12(8) (West Supp. 1993); WYO. STAT. § 6-
4-404 (1988).
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two states and the District of Columbia specifically authorize either civil or
criminal contempt as a remedy.1 86 About half the states permit violations to
be prosecuted both as contempts and misdemeanors. 187 However, even
where not specifically authorized by statute, state judges generally retain
186 ALA. CODE § 30-5-10(b) (1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. AN. § 13-36021 (Supp.
1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-210 (Michie 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-4-
105 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(g) (West 1986 &
Supp. 1994); DEL. CODE ANN. § 950(e) (Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1005(0
(1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-6(a) (1991); IDAHO CODE § 39-6312 (1993); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 60/223(b) (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE §
236.8 (West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3110 (Supp. 1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.760 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984 & Supp. 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
46:2137 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 769 (West 1981
& Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-508 (Supp. 1994); MIcH. COMP.
LAWS. ANN. § 600.2950(6)(West 1986); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 Subd. 14(c)
(West 1990 & Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-21-21 (Supp. 1993); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 173-B:811(a) (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:25-30 (West Supp. 1994);
N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 846 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-
4 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-06 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1993); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3113.31(L)(1)(b) (Anderson Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
107.720(4) (1990 & Supp. 1994); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6114 (1991 & Supp.
1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-15-3(d) (1988 & Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-
610 (1991 & Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1104(d) (1989 & Supp. 1994);
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-279.1 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.50.110(5) (West Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-10a (Supp. 1994).
The use of civil contempt alone to enforce protection orders may not be very
effective. Civil contempt sanctions are coercive in nature and are avoidable through
obedience. International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552,
2557 (1994). Civil contempt cannot be used to incarcerate batterers for past acts of
violence. If a batterer is incarcerated for some reason under civil contempt, he can
purge himself by promising to comply with the protection order and thus "carries the
keys of his prison in his own pocket." Id. at 2558 (quoting In re Nevitt, 117 Fed. 448,
451 (8th Cir. 1902)). Criminal contempt, on the other hand, can be used to punish a
batterer for previous acts committed outside the presence of the court. Id. Under
criminal contempt, the batterer is not furnished the keys to his prison.
187 At least 23 states allow the punishment of violations of protective orders by
contempt or misdemeanor charges. The states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode
Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia.
See note 152 for a list of state statutes allowing contempt charges and note 151
for a list of state statutes providing for misdemeanor charges. The recent statutory
trend is to buttress contempt charges with misdemeanor charges. Klein & Orloff,
supra note 180, at 1097.
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the power to punish violations of court orders by contempt; 18s thus
contempt sanctions are available in most jurisdictions.
While statutes providing for criminal contempt vary, there are two
major ways of seeking such sanctions-either through prosecutions by the
state189 or through actions prosecuted by the battered women themselves,
pro se,190 or with the assistance of private counsel. 191 While this flexibility
is certainly one feature that makes contempt sanctions an attractive
remedy, 192 it is more important that contempt sanctions offer an
opportunity to empower women; further, they are more practical than
criminal prosecutions for violations because they are faster and encounter
188 But see FLA. STAT. § 741.2901(2) (West Supp. 1995), which eliminated
provisions for criminal contempt and mandated that all protection order violations be
prosecuted as criminal violations.
189 Some states require that criminal contempt actions be prosecuted only by the
state. See, e.g., In re Dahlem, 844 P.2d 208 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
punishment of past contempt must be initiated by district attorney; a private party
cannot seek punitive sanctions).
190 If the victims of domestic abuse had to rely on overworked public prosecutors
to prosecute their contempt actions, many victims would never see relief, or the relief
would come too late to help. See Green v. Green, 642 A.2d 1275 (D.C. 1994)
(quoting a letter from the Office of Corporation Counsel in the District of Columbia
that indicated that the Office would be "hard pressed" to prosecute all of the contempt
motions filed in D.C. Superior Court); State ex rel. O'Brien v. Moreland, 778 S.W.2d
400 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (noting the problems inherent in placing the responsibility
for prosecuting criminal contempt motions on county prosecuting attorneys). At least
two states, North Carolina and Utah, explicitly recognize that pro se contempt motions
must sometimes be filed and require that the clerk of court provide help for pro se
complainants prosecuting contempt actions. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-4(a) (1989);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-4 (Supp. 1994).
191 The prosecution of criminal contempt actions by the victim of a domestic
battery is not novel. Litigants in domestic relations actions and other civil actions have
long enforced a court order through a pro se action or through their own counsel. loan
Meier, The "Right" to a Disinterested Prosecutor of Criminal Contempt: Unpacking
Public and Private Interests, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 85, 89 (1992). The right to prosecute
a criminal contempt action will not raise the specter of "private prosecutors." To the
extent this right to prosecute their own action is explicitly extended to battered women
by specific domestic violence statutes, safeguards can be built in to limit such actions
solely to the enforcement of the civil protection order and not to other aspects of the
intra-family litigation such as divorce or child custody.
While I believe that self-prosecuted contempt motions offer the greatest
opportunity for empowerment, the difficulties of obtaining counsel and administering a
purely private system clearly suggest that a dual state and private prosecution system
be authorized. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
192 See infra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
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less resistance from institutional actors.
B. Criminal Contempt Sanctions for Violation of Civil Protection
Orders Will Empower Battered Women
A civil protection order initially empowers the battered woman by
giving her a written legal document that legitimizes her right to be free
from violence at the hands of her abuser. Many orders boldly highlight that
a violation of the order constitutes contempt of court or a criminal
offense. 193 Battered women believe that civil protection orders will be
effective and are often told by police officers that nothing can be done for
them without such an order. 194 Furthermore, all institutional participants
support orders and want them obeyed. 195
Under a civil protection order, the battered woman is placed at the
center of the decisionmaking process. 196 She can now fairly easily obtain a
temporary order without counsel to provide much needed protection in
emergency situations. However, the process also allows her to weigh her
options before seeking a permanent order which can be tailored to her
specific situation. 197 From initiation of the process, civil protection orders
empower women by legitimizing their claims of abuse and demonstrating
to them that they have access to and the support of societal institutions. 198
If the order is violated in a jurisdiction in which the self-help system of
193 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-36021 (Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 46:2137B (West 1982); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 7 (Law. Co-op.
1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:4IV (1994); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 846(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1995); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.16(b) (Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-6-6(5) (Supp. 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1104(d) (Supp. 1994).
194 Zorza, supra note 20, at 60. Being told by the judicial system that one's
complaint is valid is empowering and may encourage battered women to come to the
courts for redress of their problems. Goolkasian, supra note 61, at 277-78.
195 Officers often tell battered women that they cannot take any action unless the
women have protection orders. Zorza, supra note 20, at 60-61. Indeed, many police
officers may not take any action until they actually see the protection order. Police
officers need to know the terms of the order and the date the order expires. If an
officer takes action that is not warranted by a valid protection order, or acts upon an
expired order, the officer may be exposed to charges of false arrest. BUZAWA &
BUZAWA, supra note 73, at 117.
19 6 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 73, at 114-15.
197 Most statutes authorizing protection orders allow judges to tailor the remedies
to suit a particular woman's need. See supra note 169 for a list of the statutes
authorizing protection orders.
19 8 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 73, at 114.
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private initiation and prosecution is permitted, the battered woman has the
power to file the initial contempt motion and can conduct the hearing
herself or through counsel. 199 This route avoids reliance on overburdened
and often unsympathetic prosecutors' offices and provides an opportunity
for battered women's groups to establish their own advocacy network.200
Even where only the state prosecutor may prosecute the contempt action,
the battered woman is still empowered because it is the order she initiated
that is the legal source of the conviction rather than the criminal law.
Providing criminal contempt as an option also increases the flexibility
of a battered woman's available remedies. 20 1 The very experience of
having a choice can itself be empowering. For example, one battered
woman might trust the court that issued the protection order and would
prefer to have the issue litigated there. Another might prefer to force the
batterer to face a jury in a criminal case. Multiplying their options
empowers battered women while protecting them from further abuse.2 2
Regardless of the method used to obtain the criminal contempt sanction,
the significant involvement of the victim in the civil protection order
process and the potential for renaming the batterer's conduct as
contemptuous make the criminal contempt route both an empowering and
199 While in many states criminal contempt hearings can be conducted pro se, see
supra note 191, the results of pro se criminal contempt actions are mixed. See
DISTRIcr OF COLUMBIA COURTS, FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON RACIAL AND
ETHNIC BIAs AND TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS 153-54 & n.272 (May
1992) [hereinafter D.C. TASK FORCE] (finding that in the D.C. Superior Court in
1989, 75% of all contempt actions were pro se, but contempt was found in only 55%
of cases tried and 14% of all contempts filed). Respondents in criminal contempt
proceedings are entitled to all the due process protections including the right to
counsel and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. International Union, United Mine
Workers v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 2560 (1994). It is the imbalance between a pro
se petitioner and a respondent represented by counsel that has led to a low rate of
successful pro se contempt actions. D.C. TASK FORCE, supra, at 154.
200 The availability of criminal contempt need not turn into another excuse for
police and prosecutors to do nothing. The use of criminal contempt sanctions by
women must be augmented by the police and prosecutors. This can be done by
allowing them to act in ways consistent with their values, for instance, by requiring
mandatory arrests and misdemeanor prosecution only for violent violations of a
protective order.
201 Contempt proceedings might also allow women to end the violence without
ending the relationship with the abuser in that filing a contempt proceeding might be
seen by the batterer as a less drastic measure than pursuing criminal charges, even if
the potential for incarceration is the same. See Kinports & Fischer, supra note 81, at
199-200; Topliffe, supra note 178, at 1047-48.
202 Topliffe, supra note 178, at 1049.
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transformative experience for the battered woman.
C. Practical Advantages of Criminal Contempt As the Immediate
Remedy for Violation of Protection Orders
1. Contempt Is Faster and Faster Is Better
In addition to the empowerment potential of criminal contempt
sanctions, this route also offers practical advantages to the traditional
criminal process. First and foremost, the criminal contempt route is often
faster than the criminal justice system. 20 3 Contempt orders can either be
filed as emergency orders in the family court, or be transferred over to the
criminal division, thus obtaining priority over other cases. 20 4
In the states that explicitly authorize contempt sanctions for violations
of protection orders, contempt proceedings are often specifically given an
expedited hearing under the statute.20 5 For example, in Connecticut, when
203 See Klein & Orloff, supra note 180, at 1126 (noting that contempt actions
allow battered women "to obtain swift enforcement of civil protection orders and
thereby secure their immediate safety...."). For example, in United States v. Dixon,
113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993), it took the prosecutor's office over nine months to indict the
defendant after a series of violations and serious assaults. On the other hand, the
victim's motions for contempt of the civil protection order of the very same incidents
were litigated within just two months of filing. See Brief for Amici Curiae, Women's
Legal Defense Fund et al. at 3-5, Foster v. United States (No. 89-449).
204 Courts often allow contempt motions to be filed on an emergency basis for
good cause shown. See, e.g., Burgess v. Burgess, 568 So. 2d 934, 935 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990) (emergency contempt hearing on husband's failure to comply with support
obligations), review denied, 581 So. 2d 1307 (Fla. 1991), review dismissed, 589 So.
2d 289 (Fla. 1991); Sakun v. Taffer, 643 N.E.2d 1271, 1273 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994)
(emergency contempt motion for failure to comply with settlement agreement);
Michael v. Michael, Nos. 93-CA-0094, 93-CA-0901, 1995 WL 11200, at *2 (Miss.
Jan. 12, 1995) (emergency motion to find plaintiff in contempt of temporary custody
order); Banker v. Banker, No. C-920774, 1993 WL 547154, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 1, 1993) (emergency motion for contempt of court's order to pay mortgage
payment).
205 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(g) (West 1986 & Supp. 1994) (providing
for expedited hearing held within five days of service of the motion for contempt on
the respondent); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 60/223(b)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1993 &
Supp. 1994) (providing for expedited hearing); IOWA CODE § 236.8 (West 1994)
(providing for a contempt proceeding not less than five days and not more than 15
days after issuance of a rule to show cause); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:2137A (West
1982 & Supp. 1995) (providing for hearing within five days of filing motion for
contempt); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 Subd. 14(e) (Supp. 1995) (requiring
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a motion for contempt is filed for a violation of a protection order, a
hearing must be held within five days of the service of the motion on the
defendant. 206 Even when no specific time period is stated in the statute,
courts have required a speedy hearing to effectuate the legislative intent of
ensuring the battered woman's safety. 20 7
When contempt motions can be heard in the issuing court, there can be
additional time savings. While domestic court dockets are by no means
under-utilized, 20 8 they are usually less crowded than misdemeanor
dockets. 209 Also, because many jurisdictions permit victims to initiate the
actions themselves, battered women need not wait for police to make an
arrest or prosecutors to file charges. 210
respondent to appear and show cause within 14 days of filing of affidavit noting
violation); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:81I(a) (1994) (requiring defendant to
appear within 14 days for a contempt hearing after violation); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
50B-4 (1989) (providing for a hearing on earliest possible date); TENN. CODE ANN. §
36-3-612(1) (1991 & Supp. 1994) (requiring a hearing within 10 days of arrest for
contempt); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.50.110(5) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring
respondent to show cause within 14 days); W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-10a(b) (Supp. 1994)
(requiring a hearing for respondent to show cause within five days of the filing of
contempt petition).
206 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-15(g) (West 1986 & Supp. 1994).
207 See, e.g., Snyder v. Snyder, 629 A.2d 977 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), in which
the court quoted with approval a trial court's reflections as to the purpose of the
enforcement provisions of Pennsylvania's Protection From Abuse Act, 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 6108 (1991): "The emergency nature of the judicial process pursuant to
the Protection From Abuse Act requires that this Court act swiftly to prevent
continued abuse and deal with contempt situations in an expeditious manner lest the
violation giving rise to the contempt become a criminal action for homicide." Snyder,
629 A.2d at 981.
208 Statistics indicate that domestic violence caseloads have grown 38% over the
past four years. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD
STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1992 26 (1994) [hereinafter CASELOAD STATISTICS].
209 For example, in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, 18,298
misdemeanor cases were filed in 1993, which averaged out to 550 cases per judge. A
manageable caseload per judge is 350. Hearings on the Budget Request of the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia Before the Subcomm. on the District of Columbia of
the House Appropriations Comm., 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1994) (statement of Chief
Judge Eugene N. Hamilton), available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL 233373 (F.D.C.H.
May 18, 1994). Misdemeanor filings in limited jurisdiction courts throughout the
country in 1992 ranged from a low of 1,861 per 100,000 in Colorado to 8,292 per
100,000 in Texas. CASELOAD STATISTICS, supra note 208, at 37.
210 This delay should not be underestimated. A family court judge in Florida
estimated that it took approximately three weeks to hold a hearing when battered
women were permitted to initiate the action, even though state prosecutors had to take
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Once initiated, contempt hearings can often be concluded faster than
criminal trials. 211 Since contempt is generally punishable by less than six
months' imprisonment, contempt proceedings are tried before a judge,
eliminating jury selection and other time-consuming aspects of jury
trials. 212 Bench trials also spare the victim the perils and stresses of a jury
trial.
Granting a speedy hearing is essential because batterers are more likely
to respond to a fast contempt mechanism than a slower criminal
prosecution, because deterrence is generally more potent when a quick
punishment follows an infraction. From a batterer's unique psychological
perspective, however, contempt also offers distinct advantages. Batterers
are manipulative individuals 213 who think they can talk their way out of
trouble or evade the constraints that society imposes on individual
behavior. 214 Also, because they tend to conceive relationships in terms of
over the action. Now that protection order violations must be prosecuted under a
criminal statute the police must investigate and the state attorney's office must review
the investigation; only then can the investigation results be placed on the misdemeanor
docket. This judge indicated it now takes three to six months to try these cases.
Reformers must remember that a major reason victims withdraw criminal complaints
is that the criminal justice system is just too slow. See, e.g., CHIEF JUDGE H. JOSEPH
COLEmAN, FINAL REPORT OF THE WASHINGTON STATE TASK FORCE ON GENDER AND
JUSTICE IN THE COURTS, GENDER AND JUSTICE IN THE COURTS 30 (1989).
211 But see BUzAwA & BUZAWA, supra note 73, at 112, who claim that
"[c]ontempt of court, the traditional mechanism for enforcement, is slow and
cumbersome." These authors, however, cite to no authority for this proposition and do
not discuss the expedited hearing provisions of modem statutes. See supra notes 205-
06 and accompanying text.
212 A jury is required only in "serious" criminal contempt actions involving
possible incarceration for more than six months. International Union, United Mine
Workers v. Bagwell, 114 S. Ct. 2552, 2557 (1994).
213 Men who batter often manipulate their partners through intimidation,
isolation, and economic coercion. Leslie Berger, The Battle Over Batterers, L.A.
TIMEs, Oct. 13, 1993, at El.
214 Some studies have shown that batterers often suffer from communicative skills
deficits vis-A-vis their private lives and relationships with their wives. Daniel G.
Saunders, Husbands Who Assault: Multiple Profiles Requiring Multiple Responses, in
LEGAL RESPONSES, supra note 184, at 14. But other evidence indicates that it is
common for batterers to have discrepancies between their private and public lives.
Matthew Mosk, Simpson Case Sets Off Domestic Abuse Alarm, L.A. TIMES, June 26,
1994, at BI (quoting Jamie Leigh, Executive Director of the Coalition Against
Domestic and Sexual Violence). Men who batter their wives-like O.J. Simpson for
example-often appear very charming to people not familiar with their private
lifestyles. Id.; WALKER, supra note 13, at 26.
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power,215 they tend to respond only to a specific threat from an identifiable
person whom they perceive as more powerful. 216 A directive from a family
court judge that he or she will lock up the batterer for contempt, which is
then followed by a contempt hearing before the same judge, is therefore
more effective than the general threat of criminal prosecution217-
especially since many batterers do not regard their behavior as criminal. 218
2. Institutional Actors Are Less Resistant to Criminal Contempt
Sanctions
Critics frequently complain that participants in the process (i.e., police,
prosecutors, 219 and judges220) are unwilling to take violations of protection
orders seriously and prosecute them vigorously.221 However, such
215 See Lerman, supra note 74, at 220 (noting that abusive behavior allows men
to establish and maintain control in their relationships).
216 See id. (noting that men engage in abusive activity because no one, including
friends or other family members, have ever required them to stop).
217 See Goolkasian, supra note 61, at 282-83 (discussing the "powerful message"
that judges can deliver to a batterer). Indeed, the threat of criminal sanctions may not
deter recidivists who are familiar with the defects in the ability of the criminal justice
system to dispense justice. Saunders, supra note 214, at 25.
218 Batterers generally perceive the threat of criminal sanctions as both unfair and
unlikely. See Goolkasian, supra note 61, at 283. Thus, the civil protection order and
contempt mechanism can be seen as fairer to the batterer and as offering a gradual
method for transforming the batterer's mindset. Unlike immediate criminal
prosecution, the civil protection order first puts the batterer on specific notice that his
behavior will not be tolerated and then gives him an opportunity to correct himself
before contempt sanctions are imposed.
219 See Ford & Regoli, supra note 184, at 130-31.
220 A problem with the implementation of civil protection order statutes has been
the judicial practice of issuing mutual protection orders. See Kinports & Fischer,
supra note 81, at 167 & n.16 (citing similar problems with Illinois judiciary); Curtis
Krueger, Domestic Violence Laws Called Adequate, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 4,
1994, at 4B (reporting that about 80% of Florida judges who handle domestic violence
cases sometimes issued illegal mutual restraining orders). Some states have confronted
this problem by explicitly discouraging the use of mutual protection orders. See, e.g.,
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602G (Supp. 1994) (providing that a mutual order shall
not be granted automatically and requiring a verified petition to do so); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 750, para. 60/215 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994) (prohibiting the use of "mutual
orders" completely but allowing "correlative separate orders" if both parties can
prove abuse by the other party); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-6(3) (Supp. 1994)
(providing for mutual orders only upon stipulation).
221 The most significant criticism of the judiciary that remains today includes the
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criticism fails to differentiate among the various enforcement methods. In
many cases, the criminal contempt sanction accommodates the needs of
bureaucratic actors better than the other methods and thereby will result in
more effective enforcement of protection orders.
Most significantly, implementation of criminal contempt sanctions can
be tailored to the resources and commitment level of the various
institutional actors. In jurisdictions where the prosecutor's office is willing
to cooperate, separate domestic violence contempt units have been
established with some success. 222 Where prosecutors lack the resources or
commitment, advocates can devote the financial and human resources of
women's groups and request the pro bono efforts of sympathetic members
of the domestic relations bar to provide legal assistance.223
refusal to give jail time for violations of protection orders. Kinports & Fischer, supra
note 81, at 232; Karen Freifeld, Abuse Hits Home, NEWSDAY, Sept. 25, 1994, at A4
(reporting that in 1993 in the Bronx, N.Y., of 208 batterers facing criminal contempt
charges for violating protection orders, only 38 went to jail). Statistics indicate that
actual jail time, if given, is very low. RULE OF THUMB, supra note 80, at 44-45. Thus,
the potential advantages of immediate arrest, fines, and jail time are often not
realized. Johnson, supra note 23, at 240 & n.39 (citing SANDY CLARK, N.J.
COALITION FOR BATTERED WOMEN, SUMMARY OF THE NEW AMENDMENTS TO THE
PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ACT PROPOSED BY S-2011 (1988)). However, I
argue that framing the issue as a contempt of court is still superior to the
misdemeanorization of violations. See infra text accompanying notes 239-69.
222 Keeping contempt actions within a specific unit, rather than shuffling cases
from one prosecutor to another as in many misdemeanor sections, minimizes the
discomfort of forcing women to share intimate details of life with strangers. See Estar
Soler, Domestic Violence Is a Cime: A Case Study-San Francisco Family Violence
Project, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS
OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 21, 29 (Daniel J. Sonkin ed. 1987). In Pinellas County, Florida,
one such unit existed before the Florida legislature abolished criminal contempt as a
remedy for domestic violence. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.2901(2) (West Supp.
1995). When one prosecutor was asked what he liked about his job, he replied that he
liked putting bad people in jail. He added that he found judges much more likely to
incarcerate individuals for violations of orders than for misdemeanors for the same
conduct. Interview with Don Gibson, Assistant District Attorney, in Pinellas County,
Fla. (Mar. 1993). This anecdote reinforces my belief that criminal contempt as a
remedy for violation of protection orders is more in synch with current institutional
beliefs and practices than criminal charges for every type of civil protection order
violation.
223 The Foster case, discussed supra, began as a contempt hearing brought by a
legal services agency called AYUDA on behalf of Mrs. Foster. See supra note 203;
Kinports & Fischer, supra note 81, at 174-75; see Topliffe, supra note 178, at 1052-
53 (discussing the need for more participation from the bar in enforcing protection
orders).
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The police, prosecutors, and the courts are also more likely to support
criminal contempt actions because they arise in contexts that do not
overburden their resources or challenge their long-held notions about
domestic violence. 224 For example, police officers called to the scene of a
battery by a repeat violator are more likely to arrest the offender if the
complainant has obtained a civil protection order, or in the case of the
persistent batterer, if she has subsequently filed contempt charges for
additional incidents. 225 Her behavior demonstrates her consistency and
persistence, giving institutional actors reason to believe she will follow
through with the prosecution.22 6 The paper trail of repetitive violations
signals to the officers that this offender is dangerous and does not respect
the legal system. 227
There is also hope that courts will be more willing to punish
contemnors than domestic violence defendants. Judges simply do not like
being disobeyed, particularly when they have issued a direct order to
someone,228 and studies suggest that judicial behavior can have profound
224 1 again refer to the Assistant District Attorney in Florida. See supra note 222.
He displayed no sign of familiarity with empowerment or battered woman syndrome.
To the contrary, he used "prosecutor talk," focusing primarily on his satisfaction with
an incarceration result. Thus, when a reform strategy is more consistent with existing
institutional objectives, it is likely that less retraining (sensitizing) is necessary.
225 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 73, at 114 (noting that the use of protective
orders will give police a method for recognizing recidivists and shows them that the
victim is willing to go to court to stop the abuse; this justifies an increased response by
the police). Even then, however, a recent national survey shows that police officers
frequently refuse to make a misdemeanor arrest for a violation of a protective order
unless the violation also appears to constitute a criminal offense. If it is not a criminal
offense, they tell the victim to see an attorney or go to court. Kinports & Fischer,
supra note 81, at 224-25. The reason for this reluctance to arrest may be that police
officers have traditionally tried to minimize their involvement in domestic dispute
cases, often because they identify with the husband and consider an intrusion into a
man's home a violation of the walls of his castle. Peter G. Jaffe et al., The Impact of
Police Laying Charges, in LEGAL RESPONSES, supra note 184, at 66. Apparently,
some officers still retain this view and frequently try to avoid an arrest in domestic
dispute cases. However, police attitudes have progressed considerably in the past few
years as society's views toward women batterers have progressed. See id. at 88.226 BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 73, at 114.
227 Id.
228 Indeed, contempt sanctions themselves were designed to allow a judge who
has been disobeyed to vindicate his or her authority and punish the disobedience.
Otherwise the judicial power vested in judges would be a mere mockery. Young v.
United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 796 (1987).
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effects on the outcome of domestic violence cases. 229
3. The System for Holding Batterers in Criminal Contempt for
Violation of Protection Orders Can Be Improved
Despite the flexibility and empowerment advantages of the criminal
contempt route, approximately twenty states230 have not yet authorized it as
a remedy for violations of protection orders. 23 1 To the extent these states
have not acted due to perceived flaws in the criminal contempt delivery
system, these problems actually can be addressed fairly easily through
existing institutions or existing methods of reform.
For example, if judges are refusing to incarcerate domestic violence
contemnors, sanctions for the violation of civil protection orders can be
stiffened. Some states now require mandatory jail terms for repeat violators
of protection orders.23 2 As with other areas of sentencing disparities,
courts can be reined in by sentencing guidelines. 23 3 For the police, a
229 Goolkasian, supra note 61, at 277 (citing B. SMITH, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NON-STRANGER VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL COURT'S
RESPONSE 96 (1983)).
230 Some statutes do not differentiate between criminal and civil contempt,
making classification of the statute difficult. Civil contempt is a fairly useless remedy
in the domestic violence context because it rarely can be invoked to incarcerate the
batterer. See supra note 159, for a discussion of the difference between civil and
criminal contempt.
231 This may be the case because of perceived weaknesses of the contempt
remedy. See Developments, supra note 55, at 1512-13. Indeed, Florida abolished the
use of indirect criminal contempt sanctions to enforce compliance with domestic
violence protection orders. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.2901(2) (West Supp. 1995).
2 32 Johnson, supra note 23, at 257-58.
233 Dissatisfaction with sentencing disparities in general has led to sentencing
reform primarily through the passage of sentencing guidelines, most notably the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Most criticism of the sentencing guidelines has to do
with the underlying statutory mandatory minimums for certain crimes such as drugs
rather than the concept of guidelines. See, e.g., Matthew F. Leitman, A Proposed
Standard of Equal Protection Review for Classifications Within the Criminal Justice
System That Have a Racially Disparate Impact: A Case Study of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines' Classification Between Crack and Powder Cocaine, 25 U. TOL.
L. REV. 215 (1994).
There is clearly a need for similar guideline sentencing for contempt of civil
protection orders. Various schemes for mandatory or guideline range sentences for
repeat domestic offenders have been adopted in several states, and various others have
been proposed. Topliffe, supra note 178, at 1046. One approach adopts the equivalent
of mandatory minimum sentences for violations of protection orders with provisions
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modified version of the mandatory arrest concept would limit the
mandatory arrest scenario to situations in which a batterer has violated an
order, a policy more consistent with their own discretionary judgments. 23 4
The most significant area, however, to ensure that criminal contempt
sanctions work is the provision of legal services. 23 5 If legislatures fund
special units within state attorney's offices for these prosecutions, at least
the financial aspect of this problem will be relieved. 23 6 If battered women
are to be responsible for bringing some or all of their own contempt
actions, there is a definite need for more lawyers (both full-time and pro
bono) to work in this field. 23 7 However, rather than being seen as an
obstacle, the provision of legal services for battered women should be
allowing for the increase of sentences for repeat violations. Examples of this approach
have been adopted in Illinois, Hawaii, and California. Developments, supra note 55, at
1513. The 1991 Prevention of Domestic Violence Act in New Jersey provides that a
violation of a protection order is contempt "which if it results in a conviction of a
second or non-indictable domestic violence offense, requires a minimum term of thirty
days in jail." Johnson, supra note 23, at 257. Some states have gone further and made
some violations of a protection order felonies. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-
06 (Supp. 1993); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.27 (Anderson 1993); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 71.16 (West Supp. 1995); WASH REv. CODE ANN. § 26.50.110(4) (West
Supp. 1995).
234 See Johnson, supra note 23, at 257 (noting that under the 1991 Prevention of
Domestic Violence Act in New Jersey, probable cause to believe a protection order
has been violated requires an arrest and a bail hearing before a judge).
235 It is possible, but difficult for a lay person to prosecute a criminal contempt
action pro se. See D.C. TASK FORCE, supra note 199, at 153-54.
236 1 still believe that there are empowerment advantages to battered women
pursuing these remedies on their own behalf through counsel. See supra text
accompanying notes 193-202.
237 Contempt is an option that "does not seem particularly attractive, however,
because bringing contempt charges is expensive, time-consuming, and likely to require
the services of an attorney." Kinports & Fischer, supra note 81, at 230-31 (citing a
survey that found that almost 75% of respondents think that the contempt process is
too lengthy or complicated and that most women do not attempt it). Battered women
also have a difficult time retaining counsel on their own as the batterers often control
the resources. In addition, few lawyers outside legal services specialize in bringing
contempt actions. Many lawyers simply do not want to take domestic cases. Finally, a
battered woman may be disqualified for legal aid if her husband's income is counted.
See LANGLEY & LEVY, supra note 53, at 178-85 (describing the difficulty women
have in retaining sufficient legal services). Thus, it is particularly imperative that local
bars, law schools, and firms take responsibility in this area. Topliffe, supra note 178,
at 1045. The creation of legal services specifically to assist battered women in
obtaining and enforcing civil protection orders should be seen as part of the process of
empowerment and social action.
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perceived as an organizing tool for mobilizing sympathetic members of the
bar.23 8 To the extent that noblesse oblige may be an insufficient
motivation, legal aid rules can be altered to omit the income of the spouse
from the eligibility calculation and provisions for payment of attorney's
fees to the prevailing party can be added.
D. The Role of Substantive Criminal Charges for Violations of Civil
Protection Orders
1. Feminists Are Mistakenly Advocating the Over-Criminalization of
Protection Order Violations
Despite the many advantages of criminal contempt outlined above,
some battered women advocates are now seeking the criminalization of
violations of civil protection orders to the exclusion of other remedies.239
The most expansive proposals would convert protection order violations
238 See Wendy E.D. Smith & Cheryl J. Terai, Project Challenge: Pro Bono
Opportunity in Private Corporate Practice, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 355 (1994) (describing
major law firms' sponsorship of program in Pennsylvania which assists women in
obtaining protection orders and enforcing them through contempt motions).
239 Professor Natalie Loder Clark states: "Only vigorous prosecution, brought
and continued at the state's initiative, teaches the abuser that such behavior is
unacceptable to society." Natalie L. Clark, Crime Begins At Home: Let's Stop Punish-
ing Victims and Perpetuating Violence, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 263, 281 (1987).
Professor Clark also argues against victim-initiated remedies. Id. at 269. Another
advocate in Chicago states: "One of our mistakes [in writing the law] was pushing for
those orders of protection. We moved away from prosecution. Now we are going back
to prosecute, prosecute." Burleigh, supra note 26, at 1 (quoting Margaret Luft of
Uptown Center Hull House Woman Abuse Action Project).
With regard to enforcement of protection orders, Finn and Colson argue for
statutes that make protection order violations a misdemeanor. FINN & COLSON, supra
note 92, at 49. Contempt has been criticized as expensive and time-consuming.
Kinports & Fischer, supra note 81, at 230.
While clearly there are some advocates explicitly pushing for criminalization of
protection order violations, the actual trend of state statutes in this direction may be
more the result of an unconscious drift in policy rather than a conscious and uniform
decision by domestic violence reformers. For example, the Model Code on Domestic
and Family Violence drafted by the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges discusses criminal penalties for violations but does not distinguish between
criminal charges and contempt sanctions. See MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY
VIOLENCE § 302(3)(a) (Nat'l Couns. of Juv. and Fam. Ct. Judges 1994). In a
conversation with the author, a member of the drafting committee acknowledged that
this distinction was not considered by the drafters at the time.
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into misdemeanors that otherwise would not constitute substantive criminal
behavior (i.e., violations of "stay away" and "no contact" provisions). 240
Some jurisdictions, such as Florida, recently abolished use of the contempt
sanction, requiring that all violations of civil protection orders be referred
to the local state attorney's office for criminal prosecution as
misdemeanors. 241
These advocates contend that criminalization of all acts of domestic
violence will serve to transform cultural and institutional attitudes toward
such violence, so that it will come to be seen as a crime in the ordinary
sense.242 They also criticize the use of civil process (e.g., the contempt
sanction), characterizing it as a "soft" approach that fails to treat battering
as a crime worthy of punishment. 243
This overemphasis on criminal prosecution is misguided for many
reasons. First, as discussed above, pursuing a contempt sanction for
violation of a civil protection order can be an empowering experience for a
240 FINN & COLSON, supra note 92, at 52 (suggesting states convert to criminal
prosecution of protection order violations as the preferred remedy, but acknowledging
that a statute allowing police to arrest for criminal contempt of a protection order is
another option).
241 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.2901(2) (West Supp. 1995). The Florida Supreme
Court noted that the law abolishing the use of indirect criminal contempt might suffer
from a separation of powers problem. The court questioned whether the legislature
had the authority to eliminate the judicial power to punish those who violate a court's
orders. In re Report of the Comm'n on Family Courts, 646 So. 2d 178, 180 & n.1
(Fla. 1994).
Florida battered women's groups supported the pure criminalization approach, in
part, due to frustration that not enough was currently being done to enforce protection
orders via contempt. They also believed there might be double jeopardy problems with
dual enforcement through contempt and criminal sanctions. See infra text
accompanying notes 264-68. In retrospect, one Florida battered women's advocate
now believes that the elimination of criminal contempt may have been a mistake.
Interview with Linda Osmundson, Director of the CASA Shelter in St. Petersburg,
Fla. (Mar. 25, 1995).
242 These advocates rebut charges that this will overburden the criminal justice
system by arguing that domestic violence should be a priority and deserves a priority
resource allocation. Developments, supra note 55, at 1526-27. This argument begs the
question particularly in regard to non-criminal acts such as "stay away" violations.
Secondly, while acknowledging that domestic violence is a priority, advocates who
argue that it should not be treated differently than other crimes ignore the different
psychological aspects of this crime. See id. at 1527 (treating domestic violence as a
special crime may have stigmatizing effects for victims).
243 Civil protection orders "merely proscribe . . . fiture conduct with uncertain
enforcement and ineffective sanctions for violations." Id. at 1511.
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battered woman if the system works properly. Second, the criminal justice
system will resist the complete criminalization of civil protection order
violations, despite hopes to the contrary. Third, past experience has shown
that over-reliance on a single solution is a mistake. Fourth, a pure
criminalization approach is overly optimistic about society's willingness to
brand every protection order violation a criminal act.
Despite the wishes of these advocates, domestic violence does not
behave like an "ordinary" crime and prosecutors and police have legitimate
grievances about being forced to treat it as such. While police and
prosecutors can be blamed for the reluctance of some victims to prosecute,
the battering theory itself acknowledges that many battered women drop
charges because they have not yet realized that the cycle will repeat itself
or the batterer is able to manipulate them into dropping the charge. 244 Even
sympathetic prosecutors recognize that criminal prosecution alone is not
going to provide the cure.245
Further, prosecutors have credible institutional concerns with the pure
criminalization approach. 246 Overloading the criminal justice system with
more, primarily misdemeanor cases will have several deleterious effects.
More cases mean more delay.247 Misdemeanor cases, particularly in urban
court systems, can take significant time to wend their way to trial. 248 More
244 It is true that the attitudes of the prosecutors and the judiciary encourage
women to drop cases, BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 73, at 58, but many women,
rightly or wrongly want these cases dropped, perhaps because of battered woman's
syndrome, reconciliation, economic fears, or general distrust of the court system. Id.
at 59. Using contempt sanctions as the first line of attack accomplishes two goals.
First, there is a process of self-selection that will weed out many cases. Second and
more importantly, criminal prosecution can be reserved for cases involving physical
violence.
245 "Prosecution isn't a panacea. It's like a tourniquet. We put it on when there is
an emergency and we keep it on as long as necessary. But the question is, then what?"
Ingrassia & Beck, supra note 45, at 32 (quoting Mimi Rose, Chief of the Family
Violence and Assault Unit at the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office).
246 While prosecutorial resources are "free" to battered women complainants, so
goes the old adage that you get what you pay for. Social reform costs money and to
some extent, that money would be better spent on private attorneys committed to
prosecuting contempt actions or on more funds for a smaller group of "domestic
violence" prosecutors rather than adding to the general pool for the district attorney's
office.
247 The fact remains that in some jurisdictions, over half of all domestic battery
cases are dismissed prior to trial or plea. See sources cited supra note 78. For the
effect that so-called "no-drop" policies might have on prosecution rates, see Corsilles,
supra note 13.
248 Some misdemeanor cases in the District of Columbia can take up to a year to
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delay and backlog invariably lead to more dismissals, as witnesses
disappear or victims grow weary of endless court appearances. 249
Dismissals demoralize victims250 and further frustrate police and
prosecutors, 251 who are generally interested only in cases with a high
likelihood of success (which means a conviction).25 2 No-drop policies and
subpoenas that compel battered women to testify against their will are time-
consuming and have significant potential to further victimize women.25 3
Finally, delayed adjudication is a serious health risk for any woman whose
batterer has already ignored a civil protection order. The first concern,
therefore, should be a speedy adjudication of the civil protection order
violation.
Pure criminalization advocates also ignore entrenched attitudes toward
go to trial. Paul Duggan, Fighting Backlog, D.C. Prosecutors Dismiss Almost 1,000
Cases, WASH. POST, June 13, 1993, at B3. The number of misdemeanor cases
clogging the court systems has been previously noted. See supra note 209.
249 See Duggan, supra note 248, at B3 (reporting that because of the heavy
caseloads and busy judges, cases get repeatedly delayed until they are finally
dismissed).
250 "At the heart of criminal enforcement of domestic violence complaints is the
phenomenon of discretionary dismissal by the prosecutor, before the charge can be
determined on the merits either by guilty plea or by trial." MINNESOTA SUPREME
COURT TASK FORCE FOR GENDER FAIRNESS IN THE COURTS, FINAL REPORT, reprinted
in 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 825, 882-83 (1989) [hereinafter MINNESOTA TASK
FoRcEI. Especially in misdemeanor cases, dismissal can be as high as 80-90%. Id. at
883.
251 "In studies of courts operating under regular assault statutes, investigators
have typically found that approximately 80% of all cases of domestic violence are
dismissed by the court either at the victim's request or because the victim failed to
appear in court." CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLITICS AND WOMEN: THE AFTERMATH OF
LEGALLY MANDATED CHANGE 33 (Claudine SchWeber & Clarice Feinman eds.,
1985). Some prosecutor offices may resist "no-drop" policies for domestic violence
cases as interfering with their discretion and as a drain on resources for the
prosecution of other crime. Corsilles, supra note 13, at 875.
252 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
253 Corsilles, supra note 13, at 875. If the subpoena power is not used properly,
it may lead to further victimization. If a battered woman is subpoenaed to appear but
later refuses to do so because she has reconciled or any other reason, a contempt filed
against her would be a second victimization. See MINNESOTA TASK FORCE, supra note
250, at 885-86; SCHECHTER, supra note 13, at 175; see also Parnas, supra note 12, at
134. No-drop policies also impose significant work load burdens on prosecutors
preparing for trial. The amount of time needed to prepare for a case involving a non-
cooperative witness should not be underestimated. It may require multiple efforts to
serve subpoenas and force the prosecutor to put the victim on the witness stand
without the opportunity to prepare her.
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misdemeanor cases, particularly those tried before juries. 25 4 Misdemeanor
cases usually have the lowest conviction rate, as jurors are more willing to
find a reasonable doubt for what they perceive as a minor crime.25 5 This is
sure to be exacerbated when a jury is presented with criminal charges for
incidents such as a violation of a stay-away or no-contact order. 25 6 Further,
rules of evidence, such as the general prohibition on the introduction of
prior bad acts, will often exclude pertinent evidence of a prior battering
relationship. 25 7
With respect to the courts, these arguments ignore the realities of bail
and sentencing in criminal courts. Pretrial detention or high bail are
usually reserved for defendants who have committed the most violent
offenses or those persons likely to flee.258 Judges are reluctant to detain
defendants who are employed, particularly if they are providing for
minors. The pure criminalization approach is unlikely to result in
immediate detention pending trial in all but the most violent cases.
In addition, criminal docket judges hear about an extraordinary amount
of violence on a day-to-day basis. It is unrealistic to assume that
incarceration rates for nonviolent violations of protection orders will be
significant. As suggested, however, judges as a group tend to look
particularly unfavorably on those who directly challenge their authority,
such as by disobeying a civil protection order. Thus, pure criminalization
advocates miss an opportunity to take advantage of an institutional bias in
favor of incarceration by presenting the case as a contempt of court issue,
preferably before the court that issued the protection order. Ultimately,
criminalization advocates must recognize that single solutions for a
complex social problem are bound to fail. 25 9 Particularly in the criminal
254 As noted earlier, such cases traditionally get the fewest resources and the least
experienced prosecutors. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. While some
jurisdictions have had success with specialized domestic violence units, ultimately the
most experienced prosecutors will still prefer felonies and other higher profile cases.
255 This is most often true in cases where the sole witness is the victim.
256 From a libertarian perspective, one could also argue that our society already
criminalizes enough conduct and creating even more criminal statutes in and of itself
is not good for society.
257 See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 404.
258 See, e.g., Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1985 & Supp.
1994) (requiring a judicial officer to detain a person prior to trial if no conditions can
reasonably assure the appearance of the person at trial or the safety of the communi-
ty).
259 Drunk driving represents another serious public policy problem that has seen
a broadening of sanctions beyond criminal prosecution such as revocation of driver's
licenses for the failure to take a breathalyzer test. See M. Elizabeth Fuller, Comment,
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justice system, for which discretion is so fundamental a component,
inflexible directives will be resisted.260 As with any crime, there is an
upper limit on full enforcement of criminal laws against domestic
violence. 261
On a theoretical level, the pure criminalization advocates are too far
ahead of current cultural values. 262 Given the high level of violence in our
society, and especially in some communities, juries resist branding an
individual a criminal when there is no act of violence, as in the violation of
a stay-away order. 263 Therefore, this attempt to transform public opinion
through labeling all acts associated with a domestic violence as criminal
simply goes too far. While words can open the door to change, those
words must bridge existing beliefs with new facts, such as in the separation
assault context. While more severe criminal penalties for domestic violence
are necessary and the criminalization of protection order violations can be a
useful step, alone they will not be effective. On the other hand, because the
legal and everyday label of contempt is a better mesh with societal values,
Implied Consent Statutes: What Is Refusal?, 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 423 (1986).
260 The general point that mandatory provisions and criminalization of all aspects
of domestic violence is counterproductive receives strong support from Parnas, see
supra note 12. He forcefully states that it is time for victim advocates to "stop their
narrow, gender-focused arguments for further change. More important, it is time for
policy makers to resist pressures from them." Id. at 191-92.
261 A critique of full enforcement is that police ignore a broad range of other
offenses. DONALD BLACK, THE MANNERS AND CUSTOMS OF THE POLICE 185 (1980).
The failure of efforts at full enforcement can be seen in other areas such as the
Reagan-Bush zero tolerance for drugs and mandatory minimum sentencing. Battered
women advocates must be realistic. They must recognize that "a budget-constrained
legal system will never devote significant post-arrest resources to the prosecution,
incarceration and rehabilitation of offenders who have, after all, usually been guilty
only of a simple misdemeanor." Daniel Polsby, Suppressing Domestic Violence with
Law Reforms, 83 1. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 250, 251 (1992).
262 See Schneider, supra note 152 (discussing the need for close attention to the
interrelationship of theory and practice in this area and cautioning against too much
"grand theory" and personal narrative which characterize much of recent feminist
legal scholarship).
263 As the level of violence in our society escalates, prosecutors and courts may
be reluctant to put much effort into prosecuting and convicting people who are guilty
of only a misdemeanor. Polsby, supra note 261, at 251. In this era of fiscal constraint,
many prosecutors and courts would like to see even fewer acts characterized as
misdemeanors so that more resources can be devoted to the most serious violent
crimes. Richard Barbieri, Saving Money on Misdemeanors; Faced With a Statewide
Budget Crisis, a Few Prosecutors Are Rethinking Their Opposition to ADR and Other
Cost-Saving Alternatives to Prosecution, RECORDER, June 1, 1993, at 1.
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a resulting incarceration for violation of a protection order is more apt to
be accepted as a just result.
Lastly, the pure criminalization approach is sometimes justified on the
ground that successive prosecutions of the same act of domestic violence
for contempt of a protection order and the criminal law might constitute
double jeopardy. 264 This was a particular concern after the Supreme
Court's double jeopardy decision in Grady v. Corbin.265 However, the
Supreme Court reversed Grady in United States v. Dixon,266 which
specifically considered the double jeopardy consequences of successive
prosecutions for contempt and a criminal offense arising from the same acts
of domestic violence. 267 In Dixon, a sharply divided Court reinstated
serious felony charges against a batterer who had already been held in
contempt for all but one of a series of acts. 268 While ambiguous language
in the Dixon decision may still present a double jeopardy issue, careful
consideration of that issue before pursuing the contempt remedy can avoid
a double jeopardy bar to criminal prosecution of serious incidents of
domestic violence. 269 In less serious cases, particularly non-violent cases
where criminal prosecution is unlikely, the double jeopardy issue should
not dissuade legislatures from authorizing both remedies for violations of
protection orders.
264 See supra note 11; United States v. Dixon, 598 A.2d 724 (D.C. 1991), rev'd,
113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
265 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled in part by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct.
2849 (1993).
266 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
267 Note that the criminal prosecution was an offense under a traditional criminal
statute, not a "new" misdemeanor for violation of a protection order. Dual prosecution
for contempt and a misdemeanor violation of a protection order still present a double
jeopardy problem. For those batteries for which both sanctions are sought, traditional
criminal statutes must be used.
268 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
269 See forthcoming article by author. In Dixon, Justice Scalia's opinion requires
a court to compare the language of the contempt order or finding of contempt with the
statutory language of the criminal offense under the "elements test." If the contempt
order or finding too closely tracks the criminal statute's language, the criminal charge
can be found to be a lesser included offense of the contempt, even if it carries a more
severe penalty, and thus violative of the double jeopardy rule. See also Kirsten Pace,
Fifth Amendment-The Adoption of the "Same Elements" Test: The Supreme Court's
Failure to Adequately Protect Defendants from Double Jeopardy, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 769 (1994).
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V. CONCLUSION: TiE PROPER CHRONOLOGICAL Mix: CONTEMPT
FIRST, CRIMINAL PROSECUTION SECOND
While contempt sanctions have substantial benefits and a pure
criminalization approach is unwise, the question that still remains is: What
is the best approach for punishing violations of civil protection orders?
Consistent with the current comprehensive approach, a system that includes
a mix of contempt and criminal prosecution would likely produce the best
results.
More specifically, contempt should be the preferred initial remedy
because it can be faster270 and it offers a better chance of some sobering
jail time before a sufficiently violent act yields the rare pretrial detention.
Second, contempt sanctions as the initial remedy will serve the
empowerment goal by enabling battered women to psychologically break
the binds to their batterers.
However, just as a pure criminalization approach will not work,
contempt sanctions, while offering certain advantages, are not a panacea
that will effectively punish and deter all batterers. The average maximum
sentence under contempt statutes, of sixty to one-hundred-eighty days, will
not always be sufficient to punish violations of protection orders. For cases
involving assaultive conduct, traditional criminal charges such as assault
and battery must be available to take advantage of the greater penalties for
first degree misdemeanors and the substantial sentences for felonies. In
some jurisdictions, newly created misdemeanors for violations of
protection orders could serve the same function in some cases.
For the most hard-core violent batterer, severe criminal penalties will
still be the only solution.271 Any domestic violence reform package must
treat such batterers as the most violent criminals are treated, including
preventive detention and high bail. 272 On the other hand, in cases involving
purely technical violations of specific provisions of a protection order such
as a stay-away clause, criminal contempt sanctions alone should generally
270 See supra notes 180-89 and accompanying text. If in a particular case or
jurisdiction, criminal prosecution turns out to be as fast or faster, the contempt and
criminal charge can always be consolidated and tried by the state in criminal court.
271 Contempt appears to be effective against batterers who are not extremely
violent but less effective against extremely violent batterers. Topliffe, supra note 178,
at 1046.
272 Additional measures that can be taken in the most serious cases include notice
to victims and confidentiality of their addresses, prohibition on reduction in bail
without the knowledge of the initial court's reasons, and determination of the
defendant's criminal record prior to setting bail. Johnson, supra note 23, at 243 n.60.
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be sufficient and will offer the best chance for incarceration, if necessary.
In cases involving violent acts, however, contempt can still be the first
remedy pursued by the victim, independent of criminal prosecution,
although cognizant of the potential double jeopardy issue. This strategy
allows prosecutors to retain their traditional discretion 273  without
permitting the batterer to escape swift punishment.
An approach taking advantage of the speed and empowerment features
of contempt and the stiffer penalties under criminal law is consistent with
the comprehensive approach to domestic violence reform that seems to
yield the best results. 274 A contempt and criminal sanction approach also
can be easily integrated with domestic violence courts and specialized
prosecution units. Lastly, the need for attorneys to prosecute these actions
in some jurisdictions can be seen as a positive avenue for concerned
attorneys and advocacy organizations to take beneficial social action. Thus,
in most significant respects, using contempt and criminal sanctions in
unison is a winning proposition for battered women and the institutional
actors involved in domestic violence control.
273 Such factors include the seriousness of the assault, assessment of future
dangerousness, and the interests of the complainant in proceeding. Certainly, in the
most violent cases, or cases involving weapons or a risk to minors, prosecutors should
have a decided bias in favor of proceeding even in the absence of the complainant's
cooperation.
274 See, for example, MNN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01, subd. 14 (West 1990 &
Supp. 1995) which provides that a violation of a protection order is both a
misdemeanor and contempt of court. Id.
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